South Carolina Law Review
Volume 43
Issue 4 Symposium on Bankruptcy: The
Trustee's Avoiding Powers

Article 5

Summer 1992

Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations: Issues of Current Interest
Gerald K. Smith
Frank R. Kennedy
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Smith, Gerald K. and Kennedy, Frank R. (1992) "Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations: Issues of Current
Interest," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 43 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss4/5

This Symposium Paper is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Smith and Kennedy: Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations: Issues of Current Interest

FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS AND
OBLIGATIONS: ISSUES OF CURRENT
INTEREST
GERALD

I.

II.
III.
IV.

V.
VI.

K.

SMITH* AND FRANK

R.

KENNEDY**

INTRODUCTION .......................................
THE TREATMENT OF FRAUDULENT OBLIGATIONS ...........
TRANSFEREE DEFINED ....................................
LIABILITY OF THOSE BENEFITTED AND PARTICIPANTS

710
714
720
IN

FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS .................................
TIME TO FILE SUIT ......................................
BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 546(e): A SAFE HARBOR FOR
. ............ ................. ..
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS?

723

734
751

* Partner, Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Arizona. B.S. 1958, Kansas State University;
LL.B. 1961, New York University. Mr. Smith served as Deputy Director for the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States from 1972 to 1973. Mr. Smith is
involved in commercial litigation and bankruptcy matters that involve fraudulent transfers and obligations. Lewis & Roca was counsel for Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. in the
Kaiser Steel litigation discussed infra notes 206-61 and accompanying text. Lewis &
Roca also served as counsel for the William Herbert Hunt and Nelson Bunker Hunt
Liquidating Trusts in the litigation discussed infra notes 57-66, 185-201. Mr. Smith has
no client relationship in connection with this Article, but his participation in these cases
may have influenced his views and he brings this to the attention of the reader. The
views stated herein are not necessarily those of Lewis & Roca.
** Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan Law
School; Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Institute Distinguished Visiting Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. Of Counsel, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois. A.B.
1935, Southwest Missouri State University; LL.B. 1939, Washington University; J.S.D.
1953, Yale University. Professor Kennedy served as Executive Director for the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States from 1971 to 1973. Professor Kennedy
has from time to time been consulted on matters that involve the laws relating to fraudulent transfers and obligations. He was consulted as a potential expert witness in litigation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) against Conrad Cafritz to
recover a fraudulent transfer allegedly made to the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges.
This litigation is referenced infra note 272. Also, Professor Kennedy was on the brief for
appellants in United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987), referenced infra notes 196, 202-05, 295 and accompanying text. Professor Kennedy has no client relationship in connection with this Article,
but his participation in the Tabor Court (Gleneagles) litigation may have influenced his
views and he brings this to the attention of the reader. The views stated herein are not
necessarily those of Sidley & Austin.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1992

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 43

VII. THE FDIC's FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT UNDER
F.I.R .R.E.A...........................................
VIII.

CONCLUSION .........................................
I.

767
772

INTRODUCTION

The law of fraudulent transfers concerns property transferred by a
debtor who, but for the transfer, could have satisfied the claims of his,
her, or its creditors. If the property was transferred to defeat the creditors' rights, or under circumstances deemed fraudulent, then it is a
fraudulent transfer.' The creditors' traditional remedy is to "recapture
. ..the property from the fraudulent grantee or from a subgrantee
who took gratuitously or paid value with notice."2
The law of fraudulent obligations is similar. If the obligation is
created to defeat the creditors' rights, or under circumstances deemed
fraudulent, then it is a fraudulent obligation. The creditors' remedy is
to invalidate the obligation.
The remedy for fraudulent obligations is always adequate. However, the remedy for fraudulent transfers is often inadequate because
the initial transferee either transfers or consumes the property and is
impecunious. To the extent the property itself cannot be recovered, the
creditor is allowed to recover the value of the property from "any
guilty person. through whose hands the ' asset may have passed." 3 But,
according to Professor Glenn, it is generally not possible to recover
from those who aided, participated in, or conspired to effect the fraudulent transfer because the general creditor plaintiff has no property
interest in the assets of the debtor. However, Professor Glenn views
the rule as different after judgment: "The meddling outsider becomes
liable under principles that are easy to understand, but they do not

1. The creditor's right . . . is to realize upon all property that is capable of
conversion into money or distribution. In other words, the creditor should be
able to reach whatever is available to the debtor. Now, the kind of wrongdoing
that is known as a fraudulent conveyance consists of putting realizable assets
beyond the reach of the creditor's process, whatever form that process may
take.
1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 1, at 2 (rev. ed. 1940).
2. Id. § 56, at 77; Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent
Transfer Law, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 55, 116-26 (1991). For a discussion of other remedies,
including equitable subordination, see Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate
Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505 (1977).
3. 1 GLENN, supra note 1, § 56, at 77. "The grievance asserted under the theory
of fraudulent conveyance is that property has been put beyond the reach of process normally available to creditors; hence all persons involved in the wrongdoing are responsible
for the property, and its proceeds or value." Id. § 57.
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flow directly from the Statute of Elizabeth or any modern substitute.""

4. Id. § 56. Professor Glenn cited chapters 6 and 13 of his treatise in support of
his observation. However, only chapter 6 contains any relevant discussion, and it does
not support his general statement.
The Statute of Elizabeth, it will be recalled, gave a queer sort of qui tam
action in which the recovery went, one half to the Crown and the other half to
the party aggrieved. But those aspects of the Act simply sloughed off as time
went along, although there were strange survivals in one or more of our States.
Apart from that, however, the notion that an action lies in tort is so discredited, that one may venture upon a generality. It may safely be said, then, that
there is no tort cause of action, when a transfer is made before the creditor
obtains judgment; and it only remains to notice the exceptions, actual or
apparent.
....
But an exception which proves the rule, is made where the transfer
takes place after the aggrieved creditor has obtained judgment, or procured a
warrant of attachment. We then have a "rescue", to the injury of a man who,
by judgment or attachment, has acquired the right to subject the debtor's assets to his claim; and so in that case an action lies.
An extension of this idea, however, is not so easy to justify. It has been
held that a tort action lies when the fraudulent transfer was made on the eve
of judgment or attachment, and in view of that event. The cases which go so
far seem to overlook the fact that the creditor is sufficiently protected by the
Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, and does not really stand in need of a tort
action.
Id. § 74, at 122-24 (footnotes omitted). Professor Glenn cited Schwenn v. Schwenn, 166
N.W. 171 (Wis. 1918), as one authority that supports the no-tort-action proposition.
However, Schwenn held to the contrary when a single creditor was defrauded. Professor
Glenn also cited a student-written case critique of Schwenn. It succinctly capsulized the
state of the law in 1918 as follows:
The weight of authority is that an unsecured general creditor cannot maintain
an action against third persons conspiring with the debtor fraudulently to dispose of the debtor's property. Since such a creditor has no lien upon or interest
in the property of his debtor, he has lost only a possibility of realization, and
this injury is too remote and speculative. Nor can the creditor be said to be
damaged in law, for he still has his debt, and has open to him the privilege of
securing judgment and then enforcing any of the remedies of the judgment
creditor. The result of allowing such actions would be to subject the fraudulent transferee to liability for all the debts of his transferor,however large the
debts, and however small the value of the property transferred,for the action
would be equally available to every creditor.
Recent Decision, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1918) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Neither the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), promulgated in 1918, nor its
1984 revision, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), departs from providing
creditors with the remedy of recovery of the fraudulently transferred property. However,
the UFTA also provides for a money judgment in the amount of the value of the asset
transferred as an alternative remedy, apparently at the election of the creditor. See generally Williams, supra note 2, at 116-26. Section 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988), and § 8(b)(1) of the UFTA, 7A U.L.A. 662 (1985), expressly
allow recovery from those who do not receive the fraudulently transferred property but
who nonetheless benefit from it. See infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text. This is a
significant change, but probably reflects the rule under prior law. E.g. Mack v. Newton,
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By the time of the revised edition of Professor Glenn's famous
treatise, there was a clear-cut basis for recovery from those who aided,
participated in, or conspired to effect an intentionally fraudulent
transfer. Section 870 of the Restatement of Torts, promulgated in
1939, assigned liability to anyone who intended the consequences of his
or her acts.5 This rule was more clearly expressed in 1977 in section
870 of the Second Restatement of Torts, which provided that "[one
who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the
other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances." 6 The section was intended to serve as
a guide for determining when liability should be imposed for harm that
was intentionally inflicted, "even though the conduct does not come
within the requirements of one of the well established and named intentional torts."M
One of the problems with a rule that does not impose liability on
those who aid and abet or participate in an intentionally fraudulent
transfer is that there is no disincentive not to do so. The only remedy
is against the transferee, and that is a remedy to recover the property
transferred or its value. Professor Carlson made this point in his criticism of existing fraudulent conveyance law:
One fact about the fraudulent conveyance law remedy that must
be strongly emphasized is that the debtor is not rendered more liable
to his creditor because he has made a fraudulent conveyance. Only
third parties are prejudiced. Furthermore, liability of third parties,
under existing law, is limited to the property actually received (or its
value). 8

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Kesler v.
Veal,' which reversed a Georgia Court of Appeals decision, discusses
this issue. In a case involving an intentional fraudulent transfer, the
court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict setting aside a transfer of real

737 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (5th Cir. 1984). The new language encompasses transfers that
would create resulting trusts. Under the Restatement of Trusts, if the debtor pays for
property and the title is in the name of a third party, a resulting trust for the benefit of
the debtor can be imposed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 440 (1957). Creditors of
the debtor then can reach the property to satisfy their claims. Id. § 407(3). Both the
Bankruptcy Code and the UFTA avoid this unnecessary step by allowing recovery from
anyone who benefits from the transfer.
5. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 870 (1939); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 766, 744(b) (1977).
6.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 870 (1977).

7. Id. cmt. a.
8. David Gray Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L.

REv. 643, 652 (1987) (citations omitted).
9. 362 S.E,2d 214 (Ga.), rev'g 356 S.E.2d 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
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property and awarding actual and punitive damages against the transferee. The supreme court reversed on the basis that the legislature did
not intend that the transferee should be liable for damages in addition
to disgorging the property received. 10
One concern of the courts in refusing to extend liability to those
who aid and abet or participate in a fraudulent transfer is that innocent persons might be subjected to liability in connection with constructively fraudulent transfers." However, rather than precluding all
claims, it would be better to limit liability to those aiding and abetting
or participating in transfers intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Another concern is whether the legislature intends to limit the
remedy to recovery of the property transferred (or its value); the
fraudulent transfer statutes do not address the liability of third parties. This was the rationale of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Kesler
v. Veal. However, the fraudulent transfer statutes only deal with transfers or obligations. The statutes do not purport to allow or limit liability under tort law or other statutory provisions.
Fraudulent transfer law developed gradually over the centuries,
undergoing significant formulations in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth12
and its famous restatement in Twyne's Case.13 A major event along the
way was the promulgation of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA) in 1918.'4 Thirty years later, section 67d of the Bankruptcy
Act was conformed to the language of the UFCA with the passage of
the Chandler Act Amendments. 5 About thirty years after that, the
pace quickened with the rewriting of the Bankruptcy Act's fraudulent
transfer provisions as part of the work of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. The proposed Bankruptcy Act of
197316 recommended changes that were adopted in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.1" Thereafter, in an interesting turnabout, the UFCA
was conformed to the Bankruptcy Code with the promulgation of the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)'8 in 1984.19

10.
11.
12.
(Eng.).
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 215.
See Elliott v. Glushon, 390 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1967).
An Act Against Fraudulent Deeds, Alienations, &c., 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570)
76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
7A U.LA. 427 (1985).
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67d, 52 Stat. 840, 877-78 (1938) (repealed 1978).

COMM. ON THE BANKRupTcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE COMM.
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,

Part II, § 4-608, at 175-76 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 COMMISSION REPORT].
17. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011330 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
18. 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
19. See id. prefatory note, at 639-42.
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What had been a rivulet of fraudulent transfer and obligation
cases over the centuries has now become a torrent, and this torrent will
become a raging river in the decade of the 1990s, fed in part by litigation arising out of the leveraged buyout (LBO) craze of the 1980s.
This Article is an attempt to identify and explore developing issues in the law of fraudulent transfers and obligations. The issues chosen for discussion include claims resulting from the avoidance of fraudulent transfers and whether they share pari passu with the claims of
unsecured creditors; how courts are resolving who is a transferee for
purposes of liability; the liability of those who benefit from or participate in fraudulent transfers; the time to file suit under the Bankruptcy
Code; the "safe harbor" for LBOs; and the recent enactment of a
fraudulent transfer act for the benefit of the FDIC that primes the
rights of the bankruptcy trustee under the Bankruptcy Code.
II.

THE TREATMENT OF FRAUDULENT OBLIGATIONS

The UFCA assimilated the treatment of fraudulent obligations to
the treatment of fraudulent transfers, and the UFTA, section 67d of
the Bankruptcy Act, and section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which
are patterned on the UFCA, have followed suit. It is sometimes asserted or assumed that an obligation is a transfer; but it is not. Equating obligations and transfers is appropriate only if an obligation is secured by a transfer. In such a case both the obligation and the transfer
may be voidable because they arise from the same set of fraudulent
circumstances.
The classic remedy for a fraudulent transfer is avoidance of the
transfer because it impedes the collection of a creditor's claim.20 The
successful suitor in a fraudulent transfer action is permitted to levy on
the transferred property as if the transfer had never occurred. The
transfer often is not voidable, however, by virtue of the fact that the
property has disappeared or has come into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser who is protected by a savings clause found in every fraudulent transfer law. In such an eventuality the creditor is authorized to
recover the value of the property fraudulently transferred from the
transferee or any subsequent transferee who is not protected by virtue
of its standing as a good faith transferee for value or successor to a
protected transferee.
Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the trustee to

20, "[Tihe branch of law which we are to examine ...

simply confers upon the

creditor, or a representative of creditors such as a trustee in bankruptcy, the right to
disregard the conveyance and treat the affected asset as though the transfer had not

been made." 1 GLENN, supra note 1, § 2, at 3.
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recover from the initial transferee or any unprotected transferee "the
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property."2 1 The value of the property is typically determined as of the

time of the transfer. 2' If the property has increased in value after the
transfer, section 550(d) of the Bankruptcy Code recognizes that the
transferee is entitled to be reimbursed or otherwise protected to the
extent the transferee has improved the value of the property without
being compensated. The implication of this provision is that any adventitious increases in the value of the property transferred accrues to
the estate. Section 8(b) of the UFTA23 authorizes a creditor to recover
the value of the property transferred up to the amount of the creditor's
claim. Under section 8(c) the value is determined as of the time of the
transfer but is subject to adjustment as the equities may require."
Subdivisions (d) and (h) of section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code
contain an implication that when a transfer is avoided pursuant to section 550, the transferee has a claim for the value of the property sub-

ject to the avoided transfer.' 5 The implication is strongest when the

transfer avoided was a nonfraudulent preference 8 and is weakest when
the transferee was chargeable with having an actual intent to defraud.' 7 Nevertheless, there is judicial authority for allowing even a
transferee with fraudulent intent to assert a claim against the debtor's
estate for value returned to the estate.' 8 Section 548(c) of the Bank21. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
22. United States v. Fernon, 640 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981); Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Halstead, 31 N.E. 900 (N.Y. 1892).
23. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 8(b), 7A U.L.A. 662 (1985).
24. Id. § 8(c).
25. Section 502(d) conditions the transferee's claim on the disgorgement of the
property transferred or the value for which the transferee is liable. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d)
(1988). Section 502(h) converts the transferee's claim into a prepetition claim for the
purposes of determining its allowability and priority. Id. § 502(h). Precursors of
§ 502(d) in the Bankruptcy Act generated controversy because of overweening construction. See JAMEs A. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 143, at 133-36 (1956); id. § 268, at 31011.
26. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank,
197 U.S. 356 (1905). These cases applied § 57g of the Bankruptcy Act, which is the predecessor of § 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
27. The relevant case law is not extensive or illuminating. See, e.g., In re Spotless
Tavern Co., 4 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D. Md. 1933) (disallowing a fraudulent mortgagee's
claim for cash advanced to the debtor under the Bankruptcy Act); see also Barnard v.
Seaman, 211 N.W. 473, 474 (Minn. 1926) (denying reimbursement to a transferee guilty
of actual fraud under the UFCA); James A. McLaughlin, Note, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REV. 404, 433-35 (1933) (opining that
under the UFCA actually fraudulent transferees should be denied reimbursement).
28. See Misty Management Corp. v. Lockwood, 539 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1976).
[T]he modern view is that a transferee guilty of fraudulent behavior may nevertheless prove a claim against the bankrupt estate, once he returns the fraud-
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ruptcy Code 29 and section 8(d) of the UFTA30 recognize that to the
extent value has been given, a good faith transferee or obligee has a
lien against the property transferred or a right of setoff against the
amount of the liability imposed as a result of the fraudulent
transaction. 31

ulently conveyed property to the estate. A rule to the contrary would allow the
estate to recover the voidable conveyance and to retain whatever consideration
it had paid therefor. Such a result would clearly be inequitable.
Id. at 1214 (citations omitted); In re Moody, 131 F. 525, 530 (N.D. Iowa 1904) (stating
that the trustee is not entitled to avoid a transfer while retaining the consideration
received).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1988).
30. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(d), 7A U.L.A- 662 (1985).
31. William B. Tanner Co., Inc. v. United States (In re Automated Business Sys.,
Inc.), 642 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1981) (excusing from liability a transferee that, without
fraudulent intent or knowledge of the debtor-transferor's fraudulent intent, accepted a
transfer as payment of its claim, although payment was made from funds provided to the
debtor for another purpose); Carr v. DeMusis (In re Carr), 34 B.R. 653, 657-58 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1983) (avoiding redemption of debtor's mortgaged property from strict foreclosure by third mortgagee on payment by junior lienholder of $9,022 under
§ 548(a)(2)(A)), afJ'd, 40 B.R. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984) (avoiding a transfer to the redemptioner for 31% of the debtor's equity and refusing to grant a lien to the final transferees
for lack of good faith); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 B.R.
434, 449 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (granting a lien to a bidder at a constructively fraudulent
foreclosure sale for the amount of the bid plus interest from the date of sale).
In Carr the court reasoned that because the value of debtor's equity was $30,000, the
transfer to the redeeming lienholder was constructively fraudulent, but the court allowed
the redemptioner, who was in good faith, a lien for amount it paid on redemption. The
officers and attorney for the redeeming lienholder who acquired the property from the
redemptioner on payment of its $231 judgment lien were denied a lien for their outlay
because they were found not to be good faith transferees.
The Carr case is criticized by Professor Vern Countryman in Vern Countryman, The
Trustee's Recovery in Preference Actions, 3 BANKR. DEV. J. 449, 466 (1986), for not allowing the officers and attorney to retain their interests because they gave value in good
faith and therefore the redemption by their transferor was not voidable. Thus, the court
did not need to resort to § 550(b) at all.
"As a matter of equity, the transferee is normally entitled to a credit for those proceeds of [a] sale [which violated a bulk transfer statute] traceable to funds held by the
Trustee." Ross v. Rodolpho (In re Villa Roel, Inc.), 57 B.R. 835, 839 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1985) (citing Murdock v. Plymouth Enter., Inc. (In re Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 B.R. 969,
980 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)). The transferee was denied credit in the Villa Roel case,
however, because the debtor's estate had no assets. In Verco Industries v. Spartan Plastics (In re Verco Industries), 704 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1983), the court was presented with
the problem of fashioning an appropriate remedy for the trustee when the parties to a
bulk transfer failed to comply with the notice requirements of Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) Article 6, but the debtor in possession had received cash, property, an assumption of indebtedness, and a promissory note from the transferee. The debtor was
allowed to retain the property that had never been delivered to the purchaser and the
right to recover on the purchaser's promissory note, but the purchaser's claim under
§ 502(h) for the loss resulting from the avoidance was recognized as an appropriate set-
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Although sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code authorize
the trustee to avoid a transfer or an obligation, section 102(5) negates
any implication that the trustee may not avoid both a transfer that
secures or is otherwise related to an obligation and the obligation itself.32 Section 7(a)(1) of the UFTA31 likewise authorizes a creditor to
obtain avoidance of a fraudulent transfer or obligation. The question
has been raised, frequently of late, in court opinions and commentary
whether subordination of the claim underlying a voidable lien is an
appropriate remedy for a complainant creditor. There is no provision
in the UFTA comparable to either section 102(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code or section 510(c), the Bankruptcy Code's provision that authorizes equitable subordination of a claim or interest. Moreover, it has
frequently been held that an individual creditor is not authorized by
the Bankruptcy Code to obtain relief in the form of subordination of
another creditor's claim. 4 The court is nevertheless authorized by section 7(a)(3)(iii) of the UFTA3 5 to grant any other relief the circumstances may require. This provision has been liberally construed, 36 and
subordinating the claim of one creditor to the claim of another when
both creditors are before the court is not incompatible with the policy
of the UFTA. Indeed, the avoidance of a creditor's claim accomplishes

off against the liability on the note. Id. at 1137-39. Professor Countryman appropriately
raised the question of why the purchaser should not have been allowed a claim for his
loss against the debtor's estate without regard to the setoff against the note. Countryman, supra, at 482.
Section 8(a) of the UFTA insulates any "person who took in good faith and for a
reasonably equivalent value" from avoidance under § 4(a) (1) (i.e., a good faith purchaser from a party who made a transfer or incurred an obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud). UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 8(a), 7A U.L.A. 662
(1985).
Transferees for less than fair consideration but without actual fraudulent intent
were accorded liens pursuant to § 9(2) of the UFCA in Goodhope v. Overgaard, 227
N.W. 380 (S.D. 1929) (questioned by McLaughlin, supra note 27, at 433).
32. Section 102(5) states that the word "or" is not to be read as exclusive when it
appears in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) (1988). Sections 544 and 548 allow
the trustee to avoid either transfers or obligations. Id. §§ 544(a), 548(a).
33. 7A U.L.A. 660 (1985).
34. International Union, UAAAIW v. Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co., 30 B.R. 790, 792
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing Fred Reuping Leather Co. v. Fort Greene Nat'l Bank (In
re Honesdale Union Stamp Shoe Co.), 102 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1939)); Societa Internalionale Turismo v. Barr (In re Lockwood), 14 B.R. 374, 381 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). But cf.
National Trust Co. v. Hideaway Beach, Inc. (In re Hideaway Beach, Inc.), 54 B.R. 548,
553 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (equitably subordinating the claims of insider transferees
who breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation).
35. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7(a)(3)(iii), 7A U.L.A. 660 (1985).
36. See Frank R. Kennedy, Reception of the Uniform FraudulentTransfer Act, 43
S.C. L. REV. 655, 672 (1992).
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the same result vis-a-vis all other creditors.3 7 It seems clear, however,
that equitable subordination in a UFTA proceeding must not result in
a detrimental change in the relative priority of a creditor not before
the court with respect to the creditors who are parties to the
proceeding.
Equitable subordination is appropriate when a defendant's conduct is directed toward a particular creditor who was misled by the
defendant's conduct.3 8 A fraudulent transfer, however, typically is not
directed toward or detrimental to only one creditor or even to only a
group of creditors. The importation of equitable subordination into the
panoply of remedies available to a defrauded creditor, however, enables the court to modify the relief accorded in light of competing considerations. Thus, the lien to which a transferee is entitled for the consideration that the transferee gave in a constructively fraudulent
transfer conceivably may be required to share its priority with secured
creditors whose equities are entitled to equal treatment. Instead of allowing the claim of a creditor whose security interest is avoided as constructively fraudulent to compete paripassu with other creditors, however, the court may subordinate the claim of the erstwhile secured
creditor.30

37. See David Gray Carlson, The Trustee's Strong Arm Power Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 S.C. L. REV. 841, 855-63 (1992).
38. See, e.g, American Cigar Co. v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella &
Sons, Inc.), 85 B.R. 965, 973-74 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Monzack v. ADB Invs. (In re
EMB Assocs., Inc.), 92 B.R. 9, 17 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1988) (finding that an insider committed egregious misconduct by demanding liens on the debtor's property while allowing
past and future creditors to continue investing money in the insolvent debtor).
39. See, e.g., Miller v. Borton (In re Bowman Hardware & Elec. Co.), 67 F.2d 792,
795 (7th Cir. 1933) (subordinating the claim of a creditor who induced the debtor to
deny its indebtedness to that creditor when the debtor was negotiating with another
creditor who relied on the debtor's misrepresentation in extending credit); Cambridge
Meridian Group, Inc. v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank (In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 117 B.R.
21, 26-28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (apparently subordinating security interests for loans
aggregating $61,741,000 to the claims of unsecured creditors to the extent of $5,827,541,
which represented the amount that the debtor diverted from financing the debtor's operations and needs; citing the reference in § II of the New Hampshire Fraudulent Conveyance Statue to "rules of law and equity" in support of allocating loans "between those
that are fully secured and prioritized, and loans in fact used for an unsecured purpose")
(discussed in Ellen J. Pollock, Secured Lenders Can Lose Place in Line, WALL ST. J.,
June 20, 1991, at B4); see also In re Process-Mainz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 348-49
(N.D. Ill. 1964) (finding that a lender who financed a buyout, taking the debtor's assets
and a pledge of the debtor's stock as security, and who thereafter assumed control of the
debtor's financial affairs, manipulating them for its own benefit, was a fraudulent transferee of the mortgaged assets; and subordinating the lender's claims to the claims of
unsecured creditors on determination by the court that the lender "was not a secured
creditor but in substance the owner" of the corporate debtor in view of its "control,
domination, spoliation, ownership and breach of fiduciary duty"), rev'd on jurisdictional
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In Murphy v. Meritor Savings Bank (In re O'Day Corp.)40 the
court held, after an extended evidentiary hearing on the trustee and a
secured creditor's motions, that the trustee had stated grounds for relief under sections 4 and 5 of the UFCA against the bank that financed
a leveraged buyout.4 1 The trustee argued that it would be anomalous to
avoid the liens and then permit the bank to participate in the recovered assets as an unsecured creditor. 4 ' The bank countered that it was
entitled, as an unsecured creditor, to a pro rata share of the estate or,
at worst, to participate as a subordinated creditor under section 510 of
the Code. 43 After disagreeing with the bank and agreeing with the trustee, the court elaborated on the reasons why the bank's claim as an
unsecured creditor should be subordinated pursuant to section 510 of
the Code.44 The court found no fraudulent intent on the part of the
bank, however, and explicitly declined to annul the obligations incurred by the debtor or to order disgorgement of the payments received after the LBO. 4'5 A mortgage to the bank that secured an antece6
dent debt independent of the LBO was sustained.'
At least one state has expressly listed "equitable subordination" in
section 10 of its version of the UFTA as one of the "principles of law
7
and equity" that supplement the Uniform Act.4
In Max Sugarman Funeral Home, Inc. v.A.D.B. Investors'8 Cir-

grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).
Traditionally, the doctrine is applied to subordinate the claims of insiders, but
the claim of a party not in control of the debtor can also be subordinated if he
is guilty of sufficiently egregious conduct. A lender's cooperation in a sales
transaction which is deemed to be in fraud of creditors may well be considered
such conduct.
James F. Queenan, Jr., The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 28 (1989) (footnotes omitted) (citing Taylor v. Standard
Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1939)). Queenan describes Taylor as an instance
of complete subordination of a claim of the parent company of a debtor subsidiary because of the parent's inequitable conduct. For a more extended consideration of equitable subordination as a remedy in fraudulent transfer cases, see Clark, supra note 2, at
517-36; Emily L. Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Participants in a Leveraged
Buyout, 72 MINN. L. REV. 449, 455-60 (1988).
40. 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); see also Claudia MacLachlan, Bank Lost
Place in Line, Is Sued, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1991, at 7; Patricia Rummer, Courts Bump
Secured Debt in LBO Deals to Back of the Line, CoM. LAW BULL., July-Aug. 1991, at 812.
41. O'Day Corp., 126 B.R. at 403-04, 409-10.
42. Id. at 411.
43. Id. at 412.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 413.
46. Id. at 410, 413.
47. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-11 (1989).
48. 926 F.2d 1248 (1st Cir. 1991).
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cuit Judge Cyr, writing for the First Circuit, declared that section
510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes equitable subordination of a claim, could not be employed to avoid security interests given
to insiders of a corporate debtor as fraudulent transfers. 49 After subordination orders entered by the bankruptcy court were vacated on the
ground that only allowed claims can be subordinated, however, the
court held that the series of liens given the insiders were fraudulent
transfers. 0 The opinion did not preclude the possibility that the insiders might still file claims pursuant to sections 502(d) and (h) and that
these claims might yet be allowed and subordinated to unsecured
claims rather than utterly disallowed.
III.

TRANSFEREE DEFINED

Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the UFTA defines transferee.
The courts have had a difficult time determining who is a transferee
for purposes of liability under section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The courts have dealt with this problem only minimally under the
UFTA. 1 The problem arises typically when the fraudulent transfer is a
deposit of money to a bank account or a payment to brokers or agents
for the benefit of third parties. Several approaches have evolved as to
when the one receiving money is liable as a transferee. Judge Easterbrook found that transferee status requires "dominion over the money
or other asset, the right to put the money to one's own purposes." 52
Other courts have hinged transferee status on whether the transferee
had notice that the transaction was suspect,53 whether the recipient
had a direct business relationship with the transferor, 5' and whether
the transferee was liable under common-law agency principles. 55

49. Id. at 1253-54.
50. Id. at 1255.
51. See Kennedy, supra note 36, at 662-65.
52. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir.
1988). Judge Easterbrook's approach was cited favorably by the district court in Lowry
v. First National Bank (In re Robinson Brothers Drilling, Inc.), 97 B.R. 77, 81 (W.D.
Okla. 1988), aff'd, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989). Easterbrook's definition also was utilized in Nordberg v. Societe Generale (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 848 F.2d 1196,
1200 (11th Cir. 1988).
53. See Huffman v. Commerce See. Corp. (In re Harbour), 845 F.2d 1254, 1258
(4th Cir. 1988).
54. See Lowry v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (In re Columbia Data Prods.,
Inc.), 892 F.2d 26, 28 (4th Cir. 1989).
55. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 105 B.R. 639, 649

(Bankr. D. Colo. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 B.R. 514 (D.Colo.), aff'd on other grounds sub nor. Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990)

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss4/5

12

Smith and Kennedy: Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations: Issues of Current Interest
1992]
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a transferee had to have ownership of or the beneficial interest in transferred assets before it could
be required to return them.56 Appellant, Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc.
(Kaiser), in Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel
Corp.),57 argued that Congress changed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 by
enacting section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 550(a) expressly permits recovery from the initial transferee regardless of
whether the initial transferee is the owner of the fraudulently transferred property either legally or beneficially. In attempting to defeat
liability, stockbrokers, who had received funds from Kaiser in redemption of customer stock, argued that they were not initial transferees.
The bankruptcy court concluded that the brokers were liable as agents
for undisclosed principals. 58 The district court reversed, holding that

agency principles were inapplicable because the broker (Schwab) had
"no contractual relationship" with Kaiser, the debtor.59 Kaiser's brief
to the Tenth Circuit argued not only in support of the bankruptcy
court's ruling"0 but also that the stockbrokers had sufficient control

(Kaiser I).
56. See Carson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 172 N.E. 475, 482-83 (N.Y. 1930).
57. 110 B.R. 514 (D. Colo. 1990).
58. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs, 105 B.R. at 649.
59. Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs, 110 B.R. at 522-23.
60. The bankruptcy court reviewed numerous cases interpreting Section 550,
and explained how they have employed, in essence, centuries-old agency principles. Its analysis ties into the Fourth Circuit's holding in Columbia Data
Products that the initial transferee is the one who has "a direct business relationship with the debtor." 892 F.2d at 28. That entity is generally a disclosed
principal in "conduit" cases, but it may be the agent for an undisclosed
principal.
The blunt fact is that brokers are agents; more to the point, they are
agents for undisclosed or partially disclosed principals; and, as such, they are
governed, at least in part, by the common law.
(1) Kaiser's shareholders had the right to sue Kaiser in contract to get the
$22 they-were promised for each share of common stock they turned in. At the
least, the Kaiser merger created a quasi-contractual obligation enforceable by
and rescindable against the shareholders. See United States v. Neidorf, 522
F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976) (fraudulent
conveyance action alleging dividends and stock transactions rendered company
insolvent; shareholder liability is based on quasi-contract). Schwab had the
right to sue, in contract, to enforce the merger as agent for its undisclosed
customer principals. Schwab, dealing with Kaiser as an agent for partially disclosed principals, can likewise be sued. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 321
(1958); Port Ship Service v. InternationalShip Management, 800 F.2d 1418
(5th Cir. 1986) (agent liable for debts of partially disclosed principals).
(2) The remedy Kaiser seeks in this suit, a return of the $22 per share
taken by its shareholders, is akin to the remedy of rescission. Cf. Pinter v.
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2076 n.18 (1988) (Securities Act remedy is
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over the funds to result in initial transferee liability. The later argument was premised on the following: Schwab, for all intents and purposes, was a stockholder to the outside world, including Kaiserl;
Schwab's customer agreements gave it broad rights over the cash received on behalf of its customers 62; Schwab had even greater control

substantial equivalent of equitable rescission); Randall v. Lotfsgaarden, 478
U.S. 647, 651-52, 106 S. Ct. 3143, 3147 (1986) (describing Securities Act remedy as rescission or rescissionary damages); Prudential-BacheSecurities, Inc.
v. Cullather, 678 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Va. 1987) (equitable rescission claim supplements statutory securities rescission claims).
An agent who has received things from another for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal in a transaction conducted by him has a duty
to return them or their proceeds if the other rescinds the transaction for
a cause existing at the time of their receipt, to the extent that the agent
has not, before notice of rescission and in good faith, changed his
position.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 339, pp. 97-98 (1958) (emphasis added).
Rescission predicated on fraud may be obtained from an agent with no privity
to the fraudulent agreement. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. at 2079 n.23 (citing
Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974) (stock purchaser suit for rescission against broker)).
An agent for a partially disclosed principal cannot escape liability on
"mere conduit" grounds. Insurance Brokers Service, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan, 665 F. Supp. 649, 651 (N.D. Ill. 1987). And there is no change of position
when an agent, like Schwab, only credits its principals' accounts and maintains
a lien on the money. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 339, Comment f...
(3) Kaiser's cause of action need not fit precisely into a rescission or contract niche for agency principles to apply. Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 321, Comment b is clear:
Separate liability of agent. Unless agreed otherwise, the agent is
subject to separate liability and may be sued individually without the
joinder of the principal.
Agents acting for undisclosed or partially disclosed principals are liable for
statutory violations, as well as torts and contract breaches. Powers v. Coffeyville Livestock Sales Co., Inc., 665 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1981) (auctioneer
liability for violation of UCC, interpreted in light of common law agency). See
also cases supplementing federal securities law analysis with common law
agency rules, e.g., In re Atlantic FinancialManagement,Inc., 784 F.2d 29 (1st
Cir. 1986); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712-16 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980).
Schwab kept its principals' identities to itself; it benefitted by doing so; it
has the means to collect in turn from those principals; it should be held responsible for the legal obligations flowing from its choices, whether Kaiser's
suit lies in contract, tort, or statute.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 22-25, Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990) (footnotes
omitted).
61. Id. at 14-15.
62. Id. at 16.
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over cash received for Kaiser stock bought on the margin63; Schwab
had the right to use the cash credited to its customer accounts"6;
Schwab had total control over the Kaiser cash for a week"5 ; and
Schwab had more control than a bank.68 As will be seen in Part VI,
Kaiser's arguments went unanswered and unresolved.
IV.

LIABILITY OF THOSE BENEFITTED AND PARTICIPANTS IN
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

The position taken by Professor Glenn, the preeminent authority
on the subject of fraudulent transfers, may have been responsible for
the hesitancy of courts to develop theories of recovery against those

63. Id. at 17-18.
64. Id. at 18-19.
65. Id. at 19-21.
66. The Seventh Circuit concluded in Bonded Financialthat its bank had no
dominion and control because "the Bank did not even acquire a valuable right
to offset its loan against the funds in [the check payee's] account," and did not
acquire dominion "until [the payee told it] to debit the account to reduce the
loan." 838 F.2d at 893, 934. The court indicated initial transferee dominion
and control would exist if the bank had the right to take and use the money
upon receipt merely because of offset rights or a customer instruction.
Sch~ab, in contrast, had more than inchoate, common-law offset rights.
Unlike the bank in Bonded Financial,Schwab had the right to take and use
the Kaiser money pursuant to broad customer written authorization, especially
to the extent its customers had purchased their Kaiser stock on margin, and
pursuant to industry practice and SEC rules. Schwab had the express right to
take the Kaiser money, its collateral, to repay any margin loans, and could
even hold it to ensure funds would be available to cover other customer
purchase obligations.
The difference between banking and brokerage is most prominent in the
several days just after funds are received for a customer's accounts. The bank
in Bonded Financialreceived money directed to a specific customer and a specific account; it was not able to use the money for a week before crediting that
account and allowing the customer to withdraw it.
Schwab received Kaiser's money directed simply to "Schwab." Neither
Kaiser nor DTC knew how many customers, if any, Schwab had. Some brokers
disbursed all the money, and some kept most for their arbitrage account-only
the brokers knew for sure. And until the brokers reconciled their books and
credited their customers, with no required deadline to do so, the customers
could not withdraw the money. The customer could not use the money in the
interim; but under SEC rules, the broker could use the money to make a lot
more money. Under Bonded Financial, which this Court found provides
"sound guidance," and in light of all five types of rights and powers described
above, Schwab had sufficient dominion and control to be an initial transferee,
responsible to return the cash it received and used, and take up the burden of
collecting from its customers.
Id. at 21-22.
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who assist in making fraudulent transfers. Whatever the reason, those
who assist fraudulent transfers but do not necessarily receive any direct benefit from the transfer have remained largely outside the reach
of creditors' remedies. What cases there are have reached differing results. Several cases simply state, as did Professor Glenn, that there can
be no recovery from one who aids, participates in, or conspires to effect
a fraudulent transfer.6 7 Other courts have permitted recovery.68 In Atlanta Shipping Corp. v. Chemical Bank 9 the Second Circuit held that
there is no aider and abettor liability under the New York fraudulent
conveyance statute, but that there is aider and abettor liability under
New York common law if funds are wrongfully diverted Y
In Elliott v. Glushon71 the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize conspiracy liability under section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act. The Ninth

67. See Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 878 F.2d 1271, 1276 n.1
(10th Cir. 1989); FDIC v. Porco, 552 N.E.2d 158, 159-60 (N.Y. 1990). In Mack v. Newton,
737 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1984), a bankruptcy trustee sought to assert claims against the
debtor's former principals on the theory that they had conspired to divert the debtor's
assets. The trustee argued that the transfers were made both without adequate consideration and with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. The court rejected these
claims for the most part, reasoning that neither federal law (i.e., §§ 67d(6) and 70e(2) of
the Bankruptcy Act) nor state law (i.e., the Texas Fraudulent Conveyance Act) authorized a claim against someone who did not receive either directly or indirectly any benefit
from the transfer. Id. at 1356-62; see also Menner v. Slater, 83 P. 35, 35 (Cal. 1905);
Gilmore v. Tucker, 148 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (text available on LEXIS)
(holding that a plaintiff cannot recover on a conspiracy claim unless the defendants committed a separate wrong that caused the plaintiff to suffer damages).
68. See, e.g., McElhanon v. Hing, 728 P.2d 256, 261-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an attorney who drafted transfer documents knowing that the consideration for
the transfer was inadequate, that the debtor would be rendered insolvent, and that the
debtor intended to defraud creditors may be held liable for conspiring to commit a
fraudulent conveyance), vacated en banc in part on other grounds, 728 P.2d 273 (Ariz.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1030 (1987); Dalton v. Meister, 239 N.W.2d 9, 17-18 (Wis.
1976).
69. 818 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1987).
70. Id. at 250-51. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court, which had held
that there was no aiding and abetting liability under the fraudulent conveyance statute.
The fourth cause of action contains a claim against Chemical for aiding
and abetting a fraudulent conveyance. We do not believe it possible to state
such a claim. In a fraudulent conveyance action, the plaintiff attacks the conveyance seeking to reclaim the property conveyed. The appropriate relief is to
void the conveyance. An aiding and abetting claim against someone other than
a transferee is meaningless in these circumstances. That aspect of the fourth
cause of action alleging that Chemical aided and abetted a fraudulent conveyance is dismissed.
Atlanta Shipping Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 631 F. Supp. 335, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citation omitted), aff'd, 818 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1987).
71. 390 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1967).
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Circuit declined to follow its earlier decision in Brainard v. Cohn7 2 in
which the court held that all conspiring parties "are as one who received the property, and each joint tort-feasor has the burden of bearing the entire loss.

7 3s

In Elliott, however, the Ninth Circuit limited

Brainardto situations in which the defendants have "intermixed" the
fraudulently transferred property with identical property so that identifying the fraudulently transferred property is impossible.7 4 Also, the
court ruled that section 67d is designed to cancel fraudulent transfers,
not "to render civilly liable all persons who may have contributed in
some way to" making a fraudulent transfer.7

5

The court was concerned

about how far a contrary rule would lead.
It is also significant that the term "fraudulent transfer" as used
in the [Bankruptcy] Act includes a great many transactions which do
not constitute "actual" fraud; no intent to defraud need be found so
long as the prescribed statutory criteria are met. Thus there is affirmative justification for rejecting a rule under which all persons having a
hand in transactions later held void under the Act would be civilly
liable. Limiting recovery in the manner suggested by the appellee
Glushon protects innocent persons from civil liability, while
at the
76
same time preserving the assets of the bankrupt's estate.
The Fifth Circuit followed Elliott in Mack v. Newton77 and rejected conspiracy liability under both the Bankruptcy Act and the
Texas fraudulent conveyance statute. 7 The Fifth Circuit noted that
Elliott had been followed in the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits and
that no court had disagreed with Elliott.9 Mack is, perhaps, no more

than the product of Professor Glenn's persuasiveness. In Mack the
Fifth Circuit relied on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Estate of
Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts.s0 In Estate of Stonecipher the Texas
Supreme Court, in language reminiscent of Professor Glenn, stated the
following in regard to actions in civil conspiracy:

72. 8 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1925).
73. Id. at 15.
74. Elliott, 390 F.2d at 515-16.
75. Id. at 516.
76. Id. at 516-17 (footnote omitted).
77. 737 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1984).
78. Id. at 1356-62.
79. Id. at 1358 (citing Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 685 F.2d 729, 73738 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1983);
Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1048 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979); Jackson v. Star Sprinkler
Corp., 575 F.2d 1223, 1234 (8th Cir. 1978)). The Ninth Circuit had also reaffirmed its
holding in Elliott. Id. (citing Gough v. Titus (In re Christian & Porter Aluminum Co.),
584 F.2d 326, 339 (9th Cir. 1978)).
80. 591 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1979).
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[A] general creditor has no right in or lien upon property of the
debtor and therefore suffers no damages if the debtor's property is
conveyed to others to evade payment. The damage sustained by the
creditor in being deprived of an opportunity to make a levy and this
damage is too remote. The loss suffered is not of a right, but of a
chance to secure a right.81
Recent decisions, however, indicate that the law is changing. Several courts have recognized a shareholder's right to recovery against
those who aid and abet fraudulent transfers made by a corporation on
the theory that they aid and abet a breach of fiduciary duty. 2 Although in Mack the Fifth Circuit stated that Texas law does not allow
an action for civil conspiracy,8 3 a recent Texas Court of Appeals decision suggests that relief may be permitted for what is in effect a conspiracy to effect a fraudulent transfer under a constructive fraud theory.8 1 Furthermore, one bankruptcy judge has interpreted Mack to
allow recovery from anyone who benefits from a fraudulent transfer,

81. Id. at 808 (citing Le Gierse v. Whitehurst, 18 S.W. 510 (Tex. 1886)).
82. See Samuel M. Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter, 652 F. Supp. 1066,
1082.84 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that greenmailers may be held liable as aiders and
abettors to target company's management); Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177,
182-83 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that corporate "greenmailers" could be liable for proceeds received in failed takeover bid as aiders and abettors to a breach of fiduciary duty
committed by the incumbent management); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 105658 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding that a hostile corporate raider that withdrew its original
tender offer upon reaching an agreement with the incumbent management, which included golden parachute arrangements, could be liable in civil conspiracy for aiding and
abetting a breach of the incumbent management's fiduciary duty), affd, 575 A.2d 1131
(Del. 1990).
83. Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343, 1356 (5th Cir. 1984).
84. In Speed v. Eluma International, Inc., 757 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), the
directors and shareholders of a corporation attempted a bulk sale of the company's assets. The corporation's creditors, however, obtained a court order enjoining the sale. One
of the directors, who owned the land on which the company operated, then claimed that
the company was in default on its lease and foreclosed on his landlord's lien. At the
foreclosure sale the original buyer purchased the company's assets for the same price
agreed upon in the thwarted bulk sale agreement. Id. at 795.
The Texas Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to support a verdict of constructive fraud. Id. at 798. It ruled that the directors had perpetrated a sham transaction
In order to breach an equitable duty owed to the company's creditors. The court defined
constructive fraud broadly to include the breach of a "legal or equitable duty which...
the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public interests." Id. at 796. The court held the directors personally
liable for damages and noted that the purchaser of the company's assets also could have
been held personally liable for damages. Id. Although the court based the purchaser's
liability on the idea that it was "merely a continuation" of the original debtor company,
its decision could be interpreted as relying on an aider and abettor or civil conspiracy
theory of recovery.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss4/5

18

Smith and Kennedy: Fraudulent
Transfers and Obligations: Issues of Current Interest
1992]
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

not just those who directly receive the property transferred s5 This is
consistent with section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which expressly
allows recovery from "the entity for whose benefit such transfer was
made.""'
In view of the change in the statutory language, decisions like Elliott v. Glushon, based on the more limited language of the Bank-

ruptcy Act, have lost their former authority. It is no longer true that
Congress has limited the trustee's action "to recovery against persons
who have 'received' the property in question." Fraudulent conveyances are now like preferential transfers, as to which actions would
them, as well as
always lie against the persons who benefitted from
87
those who were the recipients of such transfers.

Recent cases, relying on section 550(a), have allowed personal recoveries from the stockholders of closely held corporations if the stockholders benefit from a fraudulent transfer received by the corporation."' Thus, despite Professor Glenn, the law is evolving.

85. Ossen v. Bernatovich (In re National Safe Northeast, Inc.), 76 B.R. 896, 904
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1987).

86. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
87. Pereira v. Checkmate Communications Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo & Elecs.,
Ltd.), 9 B.R. 585, 620 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (citations omitted), aff'd, 21 B.R. 102
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
88. In Tavormina v. Weiss (In re Behr Contracting, Inc.), 79 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1987), a corporate debtor transferred $68,000 within a year of bankruptcy to American Dream Realty & Mortgage, Inc., a corporation owned wholly by a man named Weiss
who also was a director of the debtor corporation. The bankruptcy court held that
§ 550(a)(1) enabled recovery of the transfer both from American Dream and from Weiss.
As the court reasoned: "It is undisputed that American Dream is fully owned by Weiss
and has no assets or liabilities. As such, the court concludes that the transfer was for the
benefit of Weiss and therefore, recoverable from him." Id. at 87 (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 550(a)(1) (1988)). In Ossen v. Bernatovich (In re National Safe Northeast, Inc.), 76
B.R. 896 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987), the court held that $48,000 transferred from the
debtor, which was owned wholly by Bernatovich, to another corporation also owned
wholly by Bernatovich could be recovered from Bernatovich himself. Id. at 904. As the
court explained: "Bernatovich, as the sole stockholder of both the debtor and ATM, was
in a position that enabled him to manipulate transactions between the two corporations
for [his] benefit." Id. And in Ohio Corrugating Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit,
Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 70 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987), an LBO case,
the court held that a corporation which did not even exist at the time of the transfer
could be sued on the theory that it was "an entity for whose benefit the transfer was
made under section 550(a)(1)." Id. at 924. Also, the court concluded that the sole stockholder of this newly formed corporation could be sued but cautioned that some additional evidence is needed beyond the fact of sole ownership. The court stated, "Plaintiff
must prove that SHEPPARD [the sole stockholder] acted other than in the normal
course of business of DPAC I, DPAC II, or OHIO CORRUGATING [the corporations]
and must submit appropriate evidence as to SHEPPARD's individual liability." Id. at
925. There is also authority that the intended benefit need not have been received by the

Published by Scholar Commons, 1992

19

South
Carolina
Law Review,
43, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 5[Vol. 43
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REvIEW

A significant development in recent years was the enactment of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in
1970.0 Under certain circumstances RICO, and its state law counter-

parts,90 allow recovery from those who participate in or assist fraudulent transfers. 91 Although judicial reception of the RICO statute has
been chilly, this is largely because of its misuse.92 Courts should not be
hostile to its use, however, if a transfer is made with the express intent

to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors under circumstances that violate

defendant. See Merrill v. Dietz (In re Universal Clearing House Co.), 62 B.R. 118, 127
(D. Utah 1986) (allowing recovery from an individual who requested that the debtor
write a check directly to one of the individual's creditors); Hayley v. Sorani (In re Richmond Produce Co.), 118 B.R. 753, 759 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1990) ("[Rlecovery of an
avoided transfer may be ordered under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) even though the entity did
not actually receive a benefit as a result of the transfer.").
89. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 941-48 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)); see generally H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (discussing
and construing various provisions of RICO).
90. Similar legislation has been adopted in a number of states. E.g. Amiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-2301 to -2317 (1989 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. chs. 895.01 to .09 (Harrison 1991 & Supp.).
91. The RICO statute defines "racketeering activity" by referring to various criminal acts, the so-called predicate acts. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. 11 1990). The list of
activities includes criminal bankruptcy fraud, best defined by 18 U.S.C. § 152:
Whoever, either individually or as agent or officer of any person or corporation, in contemplation of a case under title 11 by or against him or any other
person or corporation, or with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11, knowingly and fraudulently transfers or conceals any of his property or the property
of such other person or corporation;
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988). Section 1962(d) of RICO makes it unlawful for anyone to conspire to commit racketeering activities, id. § 1962(d), and § 1964 authorizes the Attorney General to institute civil proceedings against anyone who violates § 1962. In addition, § 1964 creates a private cause of action for anyone who suffers injury to "business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962," and a plaintiff can recover triple
damages under the statute. Id. § 1964(c).
92. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming Rule
11 sanctions against journalists who brought a groundless RICO action apparently in an
attempt to obtain evidence on the Iran-Contra scandal through the discovery process),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992); Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container Int'l, B.V., 865
F.2d 676, 683-85 (5th Cir.) (affirming sanctions for violation of Rule 11 imposed on attorneys who asserted RICO counterclaim to deter plaintiff from continuing its cause of action) (citing Black & Magenheim, Using the RICO Act in Civil Cases, 22 Hous. LAW. 20,
24-25 (Oct. 1984)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989). There are efforts underway to
amend RICO to carve out business disputes and "garden variety" fraud. See H.R. 1717,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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section 152 of Title 18, the definition of criminal bankruptcy fraud.9"
Under RICO a plaintiff can proceed against those who conspired in or
aided and abetted the fraudulent conduct because there is a specific
conspiracy provision within RICO. 94 It requires that the participants
agreed to violate section 1962(a), (b), or (c) of RICO. Thus, assuming
the elements of a RICO claim are otherwise met, a fraudulent transfer that is, a knowing and fraudulent transfer of property made with
the intent to defeat the provisions of Title 11, or in contemplation of a
case under Title 11-gives rise to joint and several liability against
those who participated in the fraudulent conduct.
The trustee in bankruptcy learly has standing to bring a RICO
claim if the debtor is an entity because the entity can be separated
from the individuals involved in the fraud.95 The claim is an asset of

93. 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
94. Id. § 1962(d). The general rules as to criminal conspiracy are similar and
require:
an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime . . . and an
overt act by one of them in furtherance of the agreement. The government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and that he voluntarily became a part of it. The existence of a conspiracy
may be proved by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from concert of
action.
United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989);
cf. United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 537 (5th Cir.) (holding that conspiracy constitutes a predicate act under RICO), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123, and cert. denied, 479
U.S. 961 (1986); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1015 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting
criminal defendant's double jeopardy objection because racketeering and conspiracy represent separate violations under RICO), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, and cert. denied,
459 U.S. 906 (1982).
95. In Wooten v. Loshbough, 951 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1991), the court ruled as
follows:
The company's claim against the defendants for what they did to it is a corporate asset now vested in the trustee so that he can liquidate it for the benefit of
the company's creditors-including Wooten-in accordance with their legal entitlements in bankruptcy. Wooten is seeking to jump the queue-to bypass
bankruptcy-to wrest this valuable corporate asset from the trustee by suing
the defendants directly. To allow her to do this would upset the priorities established by the bankruptcy law-which gives a low priority to a judgment
creditor, who despite the apparent connotation of the term is just another unsecured creditor until by executing the judgment he obtains a judicial lien.
Id. at 770 (citing Linsey v. Federal Land Bank (In re Lindsey), 823 F.2d 189, 191 (7th
Cir. 1987); Barnett v. Stern, 93 B.R. 962, 975-77 (N.D. IM. 1988), rev'd, 909 F.2d 973 (7th
Cir. 1990)); cf. Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying RICO standing
to plaintiffs as shareholders but finding standing for limited partners to assert RICO
claims against general partners and third parties); Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange
Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1989) (denying standing to shareholders and creditors who sued individually because RICO claims can be brought only by the entity directly injured by a fraudulent transfer); Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander,
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the estate under Bankruptcy Code section 541(a)96 and derivative suits
by stockholders are automatically stayed under section 362(a).97 However, establishing the trustee's standing is more problematic if the
debtor is an individual because the debtor is involved in the fraud. In
Barnett v. Stern'8 an individual involved in various fraudulent transfers filed bankruptcy. The court held that the individual's trustee had
standing to prosecute a RICO claim.99 The court did not find, however,
that the cause of action belonged to the estate under either section 541
(because the debtor was in pari delicto and therefore could not bring
the claim outside of bankruptcy 00 ) or section 544 (the court interpreted section 544 as limited to "avoidance claims"' 01 ) of the Bankruptcy Code.1 02 Instead, the court distinguished cases that had followed the Supreme Court's decision in Caplin v. Marine Midland

Inc., 868 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1989) (setting forth a two-part test for shareholder RICO
standing based on derivative suit analysis). But see Feltman v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
122 B.R. 466 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that the Chapter 11 trustee of sham corporations
created by a convicted embezzler to hide the proceeds of his crimes could not assert
RICO claims because the debtor corporations were in pari delicto with the embezzeler's
fraud).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988); see Wooten, 951 F.2d at 770.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
98. 93 B.R. 962 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 909 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.
1990).
99. In Barnett the debtor was an individual who had fraudulently transferred personal assets to a trust prior to filing a Chapter 7 petition. Two creditors initiated a RICO
claim against third parties for their involvement in the prepetition fraudulent transfers.
The court held that the bankruptcy trustee, not the creditors, had standing to pursue
RICO claims which concerned prepetition fraudulent activity. Id. at 967-72. In Kremen
v. Blank, 55 B.R. 1018 (D. Md. 1985), however, the court held that the trustee has standing to challenge only postpetition RICO violations. The court reasoned as follows:
Plaintiff argues that property conveyed by the Debtor in an effort to defraud
his creditors prior to the filing of his Petition remains the property of the Estate. It is true that, like an unsecured general creditor, the trustee has standing
to overturn fraudulent conveyances. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(b). Property fraudulently conveyed reverts to the estate. However, a general creditor without a
lien has no legal right or interest in a Debtor's property prior to obtaining a
judgment of fraudulent conveyance. Van Royen v. Lacey, 262 Md. 94, 277 A.2d
13 (1971). A trustee has no greater interest than an unsecured creditor in property conveyed prior to the Debtor's voluntary filing of a bankruptcy petition.
Id. at 1021.
100. Barnett, 93 B.R. at 969.
101. Id. at 969-70.
102. Id. At least one court has held that although a RICO claim is not estate property if the debtor participated in the fraud, it is assertable by the trustee under § 544.
Lumbard v. Maglia, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1529, 1541-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the
trustee can bring a RICO claim under § 544 even if the debtor participated in the challenged wrongdoing).
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which held that a bankruptcy trustee does not have

standing to assert damage claims that belong to creditors.i0 4 In the
Caplin case the creditors whose claims were being asserted were debenture holders who had claims against the indenture trustee for
breach of its fiduciary duty. 105 The Barnett court relied on "common
sense," the principle of equitable distribution, and a series of alter-ego
cases in distinguishing Caplin and finding RICO standing. 06 However,
all but one of the alter-ego cases cited by the court allowed a debtor
corporation to pierce its own corporate veil, and thus the decisions are
based on the idea that the alter-ego claims became property of the estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. The one alter-ego case
that directly supports the Barnett court's holding is Koch Refining v.
Farmers Union CentralExchange, Inc. 07 In Koch the Seventh Circuit
interpreted Caplin only as denying standing to the trustee if the trustee is asserting the personal claims of a specific creditor. 0 8 Thus, the
Koch court stated that "allegations that could be asserted by any creditor could be brought by the trustee as a representative of all credi-

103. 406 U.S. 416 (1972).
104. Barnett, 93 B.R. at 970-72.
The question was settled, for all practical purposes, under the Act by Caplin v.
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., where the Supreme Court held that a trustee had no standing to bring an action on behalf of certain creditors (bondholders) against an indenture trustee. Because of the reach of the doctrine of
Moore v. Bay ... Caplin was widely understood to prohibit trustees from raising creditor damage actions generally, including alter ego claims. Since such a
veil-piercing action was not a claim which the corporation could bring in its
own behalf under state law, and thus was not property of the estate under
Section 70a, there was no way for the trustee to argue that standing existed by
virtue of this alternate route either.
The Caplin court determined, also, that Section 70e, whereby the trustee
could assert the rights of creditors of the estate, was limited to avoidance of
transfers or obligations. The court was concerned with, among other things, the
subrogation problems which would be raised when estate creditors, some of
whom could not have recovered under state law, attempted to participate in
the trustee's recovery.
Richard L. Epling, Trustee's Standing to Sue in Alter Ego or Other Damage Remedy
Actions, 6 BANKR.DEV. J. 191, 192-93 (1989).
105. See Caplin, 406 U.S. at 417-21.
106. Barnett, 93 B.R. at 967-72; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo., Inc., 884 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that an alter-ego claim was a generalized
claim and could be pursued only by the trustee because the claim is property of the
estate); S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv., Inc. (In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc.),
817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987) (ruling that if state law does not specifically forbid a corporation from piercing its own corporate veil, then common sense, judicial economy, and
the bankruptcy process indicate that the trustee should have standing to bring third
party claims and pierce its debtor's veil).
107. 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988).
108. Id. at 1347 n.11.
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tors."' 1 9 The Koch court, however, ultimately based its holding that
the trustee had standing to pursue an alter-ego claim on the same ra-

tionale as the other alter-ego cases cited in the Barnett decision." 0
Thus, the legal authority supporting the Barnett decision is somewhat

dubious.
The Eighth Circuit has taken a different view of the matter. In

Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.)"' the
Eighth Circuit held that an alter-ego claim belonged to the creditors
and not the debtor corporation. Therefore, the alter-ego claim was not
property of the bankruptcy estate." 2 The Eighth Circuit, relying on
the legislative history underlying section 544, also held that section

544(a) does not allow the trustee to assert creditors' claims." 3 Based on
the work of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United

States, the sponsors of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 originally
proposed a version of section 544 that contained an additional subsec-

tion expressly overruling Caplin.14 Congress did not adopt this proposal,"

5

and in Ozark Restaurant Equipment the Eighth Circuit found

109. Koch, 831 F.2d at 1348-49.
110. Id. at 1343-47.
Virtually all of these recent cases find that standing lies in Section 541 by
discovering a right of action under state law permitting a corporation to maintain an alter ego action against its own stockholders and other insiders; in effect, this action permits a corporation to pierce its own veil. Surprisingly, Koch
Refining v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc., suggested that standing
might also be found by inference in Section 544(a). However, the court, in a
very hazy opinion, then proceeded to disclaim that notion. The court in Koch
then relied on reasoning that was similarly adopted by the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits. It examined underlying state law (Indiana and Illinois) and concluded
that since those states did not expressly prohibita corporation from maintaining an alter ego action, the cause of action must belong to the corporation and
pass to the trustee as property of the estate.
Epling, supra note 104, at 196 (footnotes omitted).
111. 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404- U.S. 848 (1987).
112. Id. at 1224-26.
113. Id. at 1227-30.
114. This proposal was based on § 4-604(b)(2) of the Commission's Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973:
The Trustee may, when in the best interest of the estate, enforce any claim
which any class of creditors has against any person and if necessary for that
purpose, the court may stay any other pending action on such claims. If the
trustee brings an action on such a claim, he shall give notice to all creditors
who could have brought an action on the claim if the trustee had not done so.
Any judgment entered for or against the trustee on such claim shall be binding
on all such creditors and any recovery by the trustee shall be for the benefit
only of such creditors after the deduction of all expenses incurred by the trustee in effecting such recovery.
1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 160.
115. See Epling, supra note 104, at 193-95.
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this inaction determinative. The court declined to distinguish Caplin
even though the claims in Caplin were claims that belonged to specific
creditors, rather than claims that all creditors could assert. 1
A further roadblock to RICO fraudulent transfer claims are several
cases which have indicated that the RICO claims of creditors are too
speculative or are not ripe until the fraudulent transfer claims of the
trustee are resolved. Only then will the extent of the injury be known.
The Second Circuit addressed this issue in Bankers Trust Co. v.
Rhoades 1 and concluded that although RICO does not impose any
special standing limitations on creditors, any RICO plaintiff must suffer injury in fact. 1 '8 Therefore, the overlap between the creditors'
RICO claim and the trustee's fraudulent transfer claim "does not present a question of [the creditors'] standing to bring a civil RICO claim,
but rather presents the question of which and how much in damages
[the creditors'] can recover under that RICO claim."11 9 On the damages issue the court stated:
[S]hould the bankruptcy trustee ultimately recover all the fraudulently transferred assets, [the creditors'] injury could be significantly
reduced; conversely should the assets never be recovered, or should
the bankruptcy court order the claim abandoned, [the creditors'] injury would be much more severe.
Trebling and attorney's fees aside, congress intended the basic
award under civil RICO to compensate the plaintiff for injury to "his
property or business." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1984). As in other areas of
the law, this compensation takes the form of awarding damages sufficient to place the plaintiff in the same financial position he would
have occupied absent the illegal conduct.
Yet, at this time, it is impossible to determine the amount of
damages that would be necessary to make plaintiff [creditors] whole,
because it is not known whether some or all of the fraudulently transferred funds will be recovered by the [debtor] corporation.12
Although in Barnett the Seventh Circuit held that the trustee has
standing to assert RICO claims, in dictum the court concurred with the
Second Circuit's conclusion that the judgment creditors' damage
claims were speculative and premature because "it remains to be seen
whether they will be able to satisfy their claims from the bankruptcy
estate.'

12

'

116. Ozark Restaurant Equipment, 816 F.2d at 1227-29.
117. 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
118. Id. at 1100 (citing Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
119. Id. at 1101.
120. Id. at 1106.
121. Barnett v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 977 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990). In L'Europeenne de
Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the plaintiff, a
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V. TIME TO FILE SUIT
Section 546 of the Bankruptcy Code limits the time within which
avoidance actions can be initiated to two years following the appointment of a trustee. 122 Some courts and commentators have difficulty
with this provision because they feel it is too open-ended in Chapter 11
cases, where the norm is to continue the debtor in possession and a
trustee may never be appointed. In such cases the time to initiate an
avoidance action does not expire until some indefinite time in the future when the case is closed or dismissed. 123 Even the confirmation of a
plan is irrelevant to the time period within which to commence an action. In Korvettes, Inc. v. Sanyo Electric,Inc. (In re Korvettes, Inc.) 2 "
Judge Lifland became the first judge to try to correct this problem.
Not satisfied with section 546(a), he simply rewrote it:
It is thus my view that the longer of confirmation or two years
from the reorganization filing date should be the appropriate period
for the bringing of preference actions for statute of limitations purposes. Stated differently, a debtor in possession should be able to
bring preference actions until a reorganization case is confirmed, no
matter how long that process naturally takes. If, however, d case is
confirmed in less than two years, the debtor may bring these actions
until the two-year period has elapsed, so long as it has provided in the
confirmation documents that preference actions may be brought postconfirmation. A formulation crafted in the alternative is indeed proper
as the statute of limitations under former Bankruptcy Act Section
11(e) was constructed in this manner. Pursuant to Act Section 11(e), a
trustee could bring preference actions for the longer of two years from
the date of the bankrupt's adjudication in bankruptcy or any applicable federal or state statute of limitations, so long as that federal or
state statute had not expired before the adjudication. A fortiori, the
Chapter 11 debtor in possession should be able to bring preference

consortium of banks, brought a RICO claim against third parties for looting the assets of
a Venezuelan bank that had contracted with the consortium. Id. at 116. Citing Rhoades,
the court held that the plaintiff's RICO claim was not ripe because the Venezuelan bank
was still in liquidation proceedings that could result in a reduction of the plaintiff's damages. Id. at 118-19; see also Lincoln House, Inc. v. Dupre, 903 F.2d 845, 847-48 (1st Cir.
1990) (upholding the district court's dismissal of a RICO fraudulent transfer claim filed
during the pendency of plaintiff's claim for breach of contract against defendant because
the RICO injury was contingent upon plaintiff winning the contract claim); Wooten v.
Loshbough, 738 F. Supp. 314, 316-17 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that personal injury judgment creditor of corporation who sued third parties under RICO for looting corporate
assets lacked standing because the injury to the judgment creditor was indirect and the
amount of her damages too speculative), aff'd, 951 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1991).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
123. Id. § 546 (a)(2) (1988).
124. 42 B.R. 217 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 67 B.R. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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actions for the longer of two years from the date of the125filing of a
Chapter 11 petition or entry of an order of confirmation.
The district court reversed Judge Lifland, however, holding that the
statute was clear and that the court could not ignore it merely because
the court disagreed with it. 12 The case law, until about the middle of
1990, other than Judge Lifland's brief misadventure, solidly supported
the proposition that section 546(a) means what it says. The two-year
statutory limitation begins to run when a trustee is appointed under
one of the named sections; otherwise, avoidance actions can be brought
at any time until the case is closed or dismissed. Unfortunately, in
1990 and 1991, four more courts jumped the tracks. 127 Two of these
were inspired by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Zilkha Energy Co. v.
12 9
Leighton,"28 but the other acted before Zilkha.
By its terms, section 546(a)(1) does not apply to debtors in possession. The Tenth Circuit's holding to the contrary is based upon section
1107(a) of the Code, which gives a debtor in possession all the rights
and powers of a trustee subject to any limitations imposed upon a
Chapter 11 trustee. 130 Because section 546(a)(1) imposes a two-year
limitation period upon Chapter 11 trustees, the court concluded that
because of section 1107(a) this limitation also applies to debtors in possession. Hence, the court held that the two-year period begins to run
from the date of the filing of the petition because that is the date the
debtor in possession is "appointed."' 131
It is well settled that "when the express language of a statute is
clear, a court will not adopt a different construction absent clear legislative history contradicting the plain meaning of the words."'M The

125. Id. at 222-23 (citation omitted).
126. Korvettes, Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc. (In re Korvettes, Inc.), 67 B.R. 730, 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
127. Zilkha Energy Co. v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520, 1524 (10th Cir. 1990); Sparmal
Enters., Inc. v. Moffit Realty Corp. (In re Sparmal Enters., Inc.), 126 B.R. 559, 562 (S.D.
Ind. 1991); Construction Management Servs., Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
(In re Coastal Group, Inc.), 125 B.R. 730, 731-32 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991); Lil v. Bricker
(In re Lill), 116 B.R. 543, 546 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
128. 920 F.2d 1520 (10th Cir. 1990).
129. The Lill decision is dated May 21, 1990, prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Zilkha, which is dated December 10, 1990.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
131. Zilkha, 920 F.2d at 1523-24.
132. United States v. Holroyd, 732 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir. 1984); see United States
v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643,
648 (1961); Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) ("This canon of construction has
received consistent adherence in our decisions."); Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244,
260 (1945); Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 89 (1935) ("We are
not at liberty to construe language so plain as to need no construction, or to refer to
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Zilkha opinion cited no legislative history supporting the result it
reached. This omission was undoubtedly due to the total absence of
any legislative history in the briefs and supplemental briefs of the parties to the court. 33 If the court had examined the legislative history
and the historical antecedents of sections 546(a) and 1107(a), it could
not have concluded that Congress intended section 546(a)(1) to apply
to debtors in possession.
The legislative history begins not with section 546 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 but with section 77B, the corporate reorganization statute enacted in 1934. s3 Section 77B(b)(10) provided for
the tolling of all periods of time prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act and
of all other statutes of limitations during the pendency of the reorganization.13 0 The Chandler Act amendments of 1938,136 which repealed
section 77B and added Chapters X, XI, and XII, contained similar suspension provisions. For example, section 261 of Chapter X provided
that "the running of all periods of time prescribed by this Act in respect to commission of acts of bankruptcy, the recovery of preferences,
and the avoidance of liens and transfers shall be suspended while a
proceeding under this chapter is pending and until it is finally
37
dismissed.'
The Chandler Act Amendments of 1938 also added section lie,
which required a "receiver or trustee. . . within two years subsequent
to the date of adjudication [to] institute proceedings . . .upon any
claim against which the period of limitation fixed by Federal or State
law had not expired at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy." 138 In Herget v.Central NationalBank & Trust Co.139 the Supreme Court applied section lie to an action by a liquidating trustee
to recover a preference under section 60 of the Act," " and the statute

Committee reports where there can be no doubt of the meaning of the words used.");
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
133. The Zilkha case was only marginally, if at all, an avoidance action. The claim
asserted by the reorganized debtor was to recover mistaken royalty overpayments made
to the defendants on oil and gas leases before the debtor filed bankruptcy. 920 F.2d at
1521-22. The reorganized debtor cast one of the claims as a strong arm claim, brought
under § 544(a)(1), to avoid the fact that the state statute of limitations had run. Id. at
1522. Appellants' and appellees' briefs contained no reference to legislative history.
134. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, sec. 1, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912-22 (repealed 1938).
135. Id. § 77B(b)(10), 48 Stat. at 915.
136. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840-940 (1938) (repealed 1978).
137. Id. ch. X, § 261, 52 Stat. at 902. To the same effect, see § 391 (Chapter XI)
and § 516 (Chapter XII) of the Chandler amendments. Id. ch. XI, § 391, 52 Stat. at 914;
id. ch. XII, § 516, 52 Stat. at 928.
138. Id. ch. III, § lie, 52 Stat. at 849.
139. 324 U.S. 4 (1945).
140. Id. at 9.
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was later applied to a fraudulent conveyance as well. 141 Later decisions
made clear, however, that section Ile's two-year time period was to be
applied consistently with the tolling provisions of the reorganization
chapters described above.
In Davis v. Security National Bank 4 2 the trustee's preference action would have been untimely under section le unless the time during the Chapter X case was excluded. In holding that the action was
timely, the court rejected an argument very similar to the one that is
the foundation for the Zilkha decision:
Appellee argues that the appellant trustee is barred because the
Chapter X trustee might have proceeded to rec6ver the alleged preferential payment. To be sure, the Chapter X trustee had all of the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy [but] there is nothing in the Act which
even remotely suggests that the Chapter X trustee is required
to exer143
cise all of the powers of a general trustee in bankruptcy.

Similarly, the court in Liman v. Bank of Nova Scotia' held that section Ile did not bar a preference complaint filed nearly seven years
after the original Chapter XI petition, but within two years of an order
that terminated the attempted reorganization and directed that bankruptcy proceed. 14 5 As in Davis, the court rejected the argument that
because the reorganization trustee could have recovered the preferen-

tial payment, the liquidating trustee should be barred:
The fact is the reorganization trustee did not (for reasons best known
to that trustee) exercise his discretion to seek recovery of the alleged
preferential payment during the pendency of the reorganization effort.
The reorganization trustee may not have been aware of the possibility
of any such action against defendant who had been paid in full by the
Chase Manhattan Bank. As another leading text writer has said:
"Such recovery ... may be had during the Chapter X administration,
but § 261 [11 U.S.C. § 661] recognizes the possibility that either no
such action will be taken or the pertinent facts will not be discovered
before the dismissal of the reorganization proceeding, and it accordingly suspends the running of the various periods of time involved."
One purpose of §§ 661 and 791 seems plain. They suspend the
running of all statutes of limitations affecting claims provable under
Chapters X and XI by the creditors of the debtor so as to allow for
unfettered consideration by the creditors of any plan of reorganization
or arrangement. The other purpose of §§ 661 and 791 seems equally
obvious. They suspend the running of the time within which a trustee

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Wells v. Place, 92 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
447 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1097-98 (citations omitted).
337 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 63.
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in bankruptcy must proceed to recover a preference (after the hypothetical date of adjudication set by §§ 778(a)(2) and 638) during the
pendency of a Chapter XI or X proceeding so that the rights of creditors to an equal share of the
estate in any ensuing bankruptcy pro46
ceeding may be protected.
In summary, prior to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, section lie gave liquidating trustees two years within which
to initiate preference and fraudulent conveyance actions. However, this
period was tolled during the pendency of a reorganization case. This
was true even though the trustee or debtor in possession had the power
under Chapters X, XI, and XII to initiate preference and fraudulent
conveyance actions. It was against this background that the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States commenced its work
in the early 1970s.
The Commission's section 7-201(b) provided, as to the debtor, that
"the debtor shall have all the rights and exercise all the powers of the
trustee under subdivision (a) and under this chapter, subject to such
limitations and conditions as the administrator or the court may prescribe. ' ' 147 As indicated in Note 2 to the Commission's proposed
section:
Subdivision (b), is derived from §§ 188, 342, and 444 of the [Bankruptcy] Act. . . . Until a trustee or receiver is appointed, the debtor
has all the rights and powers of a trustee appointed under [the reorganization chapter]. These rights and powers are, however, subject to
the control of the administrator and the court. Under prior reorganization law, section 188, 342, and 444, granted the debtor the title and
vested the debtor with the rights, subject to the duties, and all the
powers of a trustee "subject, however, at all times to the control of the
judge and to such limitations, restrictions, Mterms,
and conditions as
48
the judge may from time to time prescribe.
The House and Senate versions of section 7-201(b) were enacted
as section 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The relevant legislative history is found in the House and Senate Reports, which state:
This section places a debtor in possession in the shoes of a trustee
in every way. The debtor is given the rights and powers of a chapter
11 trustee. He is required to perform the functions and duties of a
chapter 11 trustee (except the investigative duties). He is also subject
to any limitations on a chapter 11 trustee, and to such other limita141
tions and conditions as the court prescribes ..

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 66 (citations omitted).
1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 68.
Id. at 235.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 116 (1978), reprinted in 1978
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There is nothing in this language-other than the reference to the
"limitations on a chapter 11 trustee"-to suggest that Congress intended in any way to impose a statute of limitations on preference and
fraudulent conveyance actions commenced by debtors in cases in which
trustees are not appointed.
The Commission also incorporated the extension provisions of section lie of the Bankruptcy Act in its proposed section 4-102(a), 15 0
which later became section 108. However, the Commission neglected to
include, probably through oversight, the judicial construction given
section lie by Herget. The Senate rectified this omission by adding a
limitation on avoidance actions in subdivision (c) to its version of section 546, which, with changes not relevant here, ultimately became section 546(a) (1). 15' The legislative history states simply: "Subsection (c)
adds a statute of limitations to the use by the trustee of the avoiding
powers. The limitation is two years after his appointment, or the time
the case is closed or dismissed, whichever occurs later."1 52
Because section 103(b) makes section 546(a)(1) applicable to reorganization cases 5 3 and because the tolling provisions of Chapters X,
XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act were not carried over into Chapter
11 of the Code, the Code departs from prior reorganization law. It is
clear that if a trustee is appointed, the two-year limitation period on
preference and fraudulent conveyance actions in a reorganization begins to run when the trustee is appointed, and that such claims are
barred when a case is closed or dismissed. Clearly Congress eliminated
the tolling provisions as to the trustee. It concluded that the trustee
must initiate suit within the two-year period, but that was the only
change. It is equally clear that Congress did not intend to go further
and eliminate the tolling provisions that have existed since the first
corporate reorganization statute that allowed the debtor to remain in
possession. Nor did Congress intend to overrule prior case law. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized its reluctance "to accept arguments that would interpret the [Bankruptcy] Code, however vague
the particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major
change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some
'' 15 4
discussion in the legislative history.

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5902; HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 404 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6360.
150. 1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 68.
151. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 546(c) (1978) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 546(a)(1) (1988)).
152. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 87 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5873.

153. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
154. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
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Clearly, section 1107(a) gives a debtor in possession the powers of
a trustee. The issue is whether the time limitation in section 546(a)(1),
which by its terms applies only to trustees, also applies to debtors in
possession. Courts which have found that the time limitation does apply to debtors in possession have unilaterally instituted a dramatic reversal of prior reorganization law that can be explained only by a misinterpretation of section 1107(a) and the relevant legislative history.
Section 1107(a) was not created out of whole cloth in 1978. Similar
language was used in the reorganization chapters of the Bankruptcy
Act, and that language basically was carried over into Chapter 11. The
analogous sections in these earlier statutes had nothing whatsoever to
do with the time to sue. The only change in 1978 was to make the
powers of the debtor in possession, which had been subject to limitations imposed by the court, subject to the limitations imposed under
Chapter 11 as well.
The 1978 Code added additional references to "limitations," but it
did not change the meaning of the word "limitations" as it was used in
section 1107(a)'s predecessors. It was a limitation on the power of a
trustee to sue, not a statute of limitations or a prescription of the time
within which to sue. The time within which to sue was found in another section of the Bankruptcy Act-section lie-and it was tolled in
reorganization cases. 155 Section 546(a)(1) operates the same way, with
only one significant change: The time within which a trustee must sue
runs even while the reorganization case is pending, but the change applies only to a trustee. The prior reorganization rule as to a debtor in
possession remains the same; there simply is no time limitation running while the debtor in possession administers a Chapter 11 reorganization. Until 1990, no court had held otherwise.
Prior to 1990 courts held time and again that section 546(a)'s twoyear limitation applied only to trustees appointed pursuant to one of
the sections enumerated in the statute.15 This "prevailing view '' 7 was

Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979)) ("The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation
of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. The Court has followed this
rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications."). In Grogan v. Garner, l1 S. Ct. 654 (1991), the Supreme Court looked to the prior statute for
guidance and stated that "[a]bsent a clear indication from Congress of a change in policy, it would be inconsistent with the earlier expression of congressional intent to construe the exceptions to allow some debtors facing fraud judgments to have those judgments discharged." Id. at 661.
155. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Mahoney, Trocki & Assocs., Inc. v. Kunzman (In re Mahoney, Trocki
& Assocs., Inc.), 111 B.R. 914, 918 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990) ("It is clear that § 546(a)(1) is
inapplicable to a debtor-in-possession."); Alithochrome Corp. v. East Coast Finishing
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summarized in Collier on Bankruptcy as follows:
Note that the two year limitation period runs from the appointment of a trustee under section 702, 1104, 1163, 1302, or 1202. Thus, if

a debtor in possession is serving in a case under chapter 11 and no
trustee has been appointed, the two year period arguably would not
begin to run unless and until a trustee is appointed. The better view is
that section 1107(a), which gives the debtor powers of a trustee and
subjects the debtor in possession to the limitations placed on a trustee, does not equate service of the debtor in possession with the appointment of a trustee for the purposes of section 546(a). 58

Moreover, section 546(a) escaped the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 unchanged. 158 At the time Congress

was considering the 1984 amendments there were at least two reported
decisions which held that section 546(a)(1) does not apply to debtors in
possession. 160 This is some evidence that the Zilkha construction does
not square with congressional intent.'"
In Lill v. Bricker (In re Lill),'6 2 however, the court, without any
discussion or authority, reached the same conclusion that the Zilkha
court did.' 63 And after Zilkha the courts in Sparmal Enterprises,Inc.
v. Moffit Realty Corp. (In re Sparmal Enterprises,Inc.)164 and ConstructionManagement Services, Inc. v. ManufacturersHanover Trust

Sales Corp. (In re Alithochrome Corp.), 53 B.R. 906, 909 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("Alithochrome properly argues that that two year statute of limitations does not apply
to preference actions brought by a Chapter 11 debtor in possession.").
157. Boatman v. E.J. Davis Co. (In re Choice Vend, Inc.), 49 B.R. 719, 720 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1985).
158. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

546.02, at 546-10 to -11 (Lawrence P. King et al.

eds., 15th ed. 1991) (footnote omitted); see id. at 546-11 n.9 ("Section 546(a)(1) is inapplicable to debtors in possession; thus a debtor in possession may commence a suit to
recover a preference more than two years after the filing of the petition.").
159. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, sec. 351, § 546(c)-(e), 98 Stat. 333, 358-59.
160. Edleman v. Gleason (In re Silver Mill Frozen Foods, Inc.), 23 B.R. 179, 181
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982); One Mktg. Co. v. Addington & Assocs. (In re One Mktg. Co.),
17 B.R. 738, 739 (Bankr. S.D. T'ex. 1982).
161. See Korvettes, Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc. (In re Korvettes, Inc.), 67 B.R. 730, 733
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Choice Vend, 49 B.R. at 721 ("It may be presumed Congress was aware
of this interpretation and desired no change."); see also Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v.
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 667 F.2d 316, 321 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[Courts] can
presume that Congress is aware of settled judicial constructions of existing law, and that
it intends to retain those remedies that it has left in place." (citation omitted)).
162. 116 B.R. 543 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
163. Lill was decided before Zilkha. Thus, the court had no authority and cited
none; it relied on its own two sentence analysis of the interplay between § 546(a)(1) and
§ 1107(a). Id. at 546. '
164. 126 B.R. 559 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
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Co. (In re Coastal Group, Inc.)"6 5 chose to ignore the "prevailing view"
and follow Zilkha. The most recent pronouncements on the subject,
however, considered all four decisions and rejected them. 66 The Zilkha
view has been rejected not only because of its inconsistency with the
language of the statute and legislative history but for policy reasons
that were well summarized by the district court in Korvettes:
As the authorities that have considered the question have recognized, this conclusion is well-grounded in policy. The respective duties
of a debtor in possession and a trustee make application of the two
year rule inappropriate to constrain a debtor in possession. While a
debtor in possession continues the operation of the business, a trustee
appointed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704 is responsible for the expeditious liquidation of the estate in order to protect the interest of the
creditors. While a trustee's tasks include pursuing preferential transfer claims in furtherance of liquidation of assets, a debtor in possession traditionally will not attack ancillary
issues such as preferences
167
until it has dealt with reorganization.
Section 546(a)(1) explicitly provides that trustees have two years
from the date of their appointment to bring an action under sections
544 or 548 of the Code. Any contrary interpretation is flatly inconsistent with the language of the statute and with all prior case law interpreting it. 168 If section 546 imposed a two-year limitation upon all
claims, it could very easily and simply have said that "an action or
proceeding under section 544 . . . may not be commenced after two
years from the date of the filing of the petition." That, however, is not

what section 546 says.
165. 125 B.R. 730 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991).
166. E.g. Caplan v. United States Brass & Copper Co. (In re Century Brass Prods.,
Inc.), 127 B.R. 720, 721 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) ("The law in this circuit, with which this
court concurs, convincingly rebuts the Zilkha analysis."); United States Lines, Inc. v.
United States (In re McLean Indus., Inc.), 132 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); Mancuso v. Continental Bank Nat'l Ass'n (In re Topcor, Inc.), 132 B.R. 119 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1991); Pate v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 136 B.R. 437 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991); Pullman
Constr. Indus., Inc. v. National Steel Serv. Center (In re Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc.),
132 B.R. 359, 363 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1991) ("Use of the term 'limitation' in § 1107(a)
plainly does not mean 'statute of limitations.' The Congress would have used the latter
phrase if that was intended, for 'statute of limitations' is a term of art with readily understood meaning."); Katon v. International Bank (In re Tamiami Range & Gun Shop,
Inc.), 130 B.R. 617 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
167. Korvettes, 67 B.R. at 733.34.
168. See, e.g., Edleman v. Gleason (In re Silver Mill Frozen Foods, Inc.), 23 B.R.
179, 181 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982) ("The statute is clear that the two year limitation
runs from the date the trustee is appointed, not the date the case is filed."); 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY. supra note 158, at 546-11 ("If a trustee is appointed in a case under
chapter 11 or in a case converted from chapter 11, he will have two years from the date
of his appointment to commence actions pursuant to § 546(a).").
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The court in Coastal Group distinguished cases in which trustees
had been appointed from those in which no trustee had been appointed. 16 9 The Zilkha court specifically declined to take a position on
that issue but indicated that its conclusion might be different in the
case of a subsequently appointed trustee. 17 0 It did so, both by citing a
case in which the court rejected the very argument' 7 ' and by acknowledging that the appointment of a trustee
is "a distinguishable circum17
stance requiring a different analysis.'

1

In Boatman v. E.J. Davis Co. (In re Choice Vend, Inc.),'1 the case
cited by the Zilkha court, a voluntary Chapter 11 case was filed on
December 21, 1981. A trustee was appointed on February 7, 1983, and
a section 547 suit was filed on September 26, 1984.27" The defendant
argued that "the two-year period referred to in § [546(a)(1)] starts
when a voluntary petition is filed," and hence the trustee's suit was
barred. 75 The court flatly rejected the defendant's argument "as unsupported and contrary to the clear language of the statute." 7 If the
two year limitation began to run on the date the bankruptcy petition is
filed, it would produce wildly and intolerably disparate results in
fraudulent conveyance cases because the time available for suits by
trustees would vary from one case to the next.
A Chapter 11 debtor normally is more interested in preserving relationships and thus has little incentive to pursue preference and
fraudulent conveyance actions. This incentive is further lessened because "the debtor in possession and the debtor who made the preferential transfer being one and the same, there may be no inclination to

169. Coastal Group, 125 B.R. at 731-32.
170. Zilkha Energy Co. v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520, 1524 n.11 (10th Cir. 1990).
171. Id. (citing Boatman v. E.J. Davis Co. (In re Choice Vend, Inc.), 49 B.R. 719,
720 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985)).
172. Id.
173. 49 B.R. 719 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985).
174. Id. at 720 & n.1.
175. Id. at 720.
176. Id.; accord One Mktg. Co. v. Addington & Assocs. (In re One Mktg. Co.), 17
B.R. 738, 739-40 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982) ("If the statute of limitations is allowed to run
before the appointment of an independent trustee, this might harm other creditors.").
Without this approximate two-year period, a trustee who does not immediately
determine what potential claims are available for the recovery of assets may
forever be barred from asserting those claims if the statute of limitations ex-

pires early in the bankruptcy, or potentially before the trustee is even appointed. Such would contravene the broad powers Congress has granted to the
trustee under §§ 544, 547 and 548 of the Code to recover property for the benefit of the estate.
Rosania v. Haligas (In re Dry Wall Supply, Inc.), 111 B.R. 933, 937 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1992

35

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEw

[Vol. 43

177
seek a return of the preferential transfer.
Several courts have held that section 546(a) extends the time for
bringing avoidance actions if the state statute of limitations has not yet
run at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.1 7 However, Judge Abramson held in Lynn v. NCNB Texas National Bank (In re Corland
70
Corp.)1
that section 546 does not extend the running of the state statute of limitations. Judge Abramson's decision was based, at least in
part, on two concerns. First, he noted that the plaintiffs had not cited
any cases in which a court had held that section 546(a) extends a state
statute of limitations. 8 0 Second, Judge Abramson was concerned that a
contrary holding "would render the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 108(a)
meaningless at least in bankruptcy cases filed where trustees are appointed. In such instances, section 546(a) would always control regardless of whether or not the limitations period found in section 108 had
expired."181 In Mahoney, Trocki & Assocs., Inc. v. Kunzman (In re
Mahoney, Trocki & Assocs., Inc.)"8 2 the court answered the second
concern by pointing out that section 108 does not apply at all because
a fraudulent transfer action maintained under section 544(b) is
"clearly the creation of the Bankruptcy Code," and section "'108(a)
refers to pre-filing causes of action belonging to the debtor and not to a
cause of action created by the Bankruptcy Code.' ," Therefore, when
the issue next came before him, Judge Abramson reversed himself and
held that section 546(a) controls 8when
the state statute has not run
4
prior to the filing of the petition.
85
In Pate v. Hunt (In re Hunt)1
Nelson Bunker Hunt and William
Herbert Hunt filed Chapter 11 cases on September 21, 1988. Reorgani-

177. One Marketing, 17 B.R. at 739.
178. Dry Wall Supply, 111 B.R. at 936 ("[A]s long as the state law statute of limita-

tions has not run before the debtor's filing for bankruptcy, the trustee can bring a fraudulent conveyance action as long as he complies with the provisions of § 546(a)."); Mahoney, Trocki & Assocs., Inc. v. Kunzman (In re Mahoney, Trocki & Assocs., Inc.), 111
B.R. 914, 920 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990) ("So long as the statute of limitations has not run
at the filing of the petition, the trustee may then utilize the provisions of § 546(a)."); see
In re Revco D.S., Inc., 118 B.R. 468, 498 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (appendix) ("[T]he
weight of authority supports the proposition that as long as the statute of limitations has
not run as of the date of the filing of the petition, section 546(a) acts to extend the time
to bring the cause of action.").
179. Adv. No. 388-3529 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 1989).

180. Id. at 17.
181. Id. at 17-18.
182. 111 B.R. 914 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990).
183. Id. at 920 (quoting Andrew v. Coopersmith (In re Downtown Inv. Club I1), 89
B.R. 59, 65 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988)).
184. Mancuso v. Continental Bank Nat'l Ass'n (In re Topcor, Inc.), 132 B.R. 119,
124 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
185. 136 B.R. 437 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
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zation plans were confirmed in the cases in December of 1989. Under
the plans assets and causes of action were transferred to liquidating
trusts. On June 11, 1991, the trustees of the liquidating trusts initiated
adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy cases seeking to avoid transfers under sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and to recover
the properties transferred or their value."8 6 The defendants included
the debtors' relatives and "trustees of trusts created for the benefit of
the Debtors' children and grandchildren," along with certain corporate,
general partnership, and limited partnership entities in which
the indi87
vidual defendants or their trusts had ownership interests. 1
Motions to dismiss were urged by defendants who asserted that
the claims were time barred by state statutes of limitations and section
546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The independent trustees had been
appointed pursuant to the plans in January 1990, and the fraudulent
transfer actions were filed in June 1991. Thus, more than two years
had expired between the date of the filing of the bankruptcy cases and
the filing of the fraudulent transfer actions, but only one year and six
months had expired between the trustees' appointments and the filing
of the fraudulent transfer actions. If section 546(a) controlled and the
two-year period within which actions under sections 544 and 548 can
be brought commenced running at the date of the filing of the Chapter
11 cases, the fraudulent transfer actions were time barred.
Because many millions of dollars worth of properties and cash had
been transferred, this was a significant matter but not one of first impression before Judge Abramson. He had decided Mancuso v. Continental Bank National Ass'n (In re Topcor, Inc.)8 s approximately two
months earlier. In Topcor Judge Abramson held that section 108 of the
Bankruptcy Code does not control the time within which a section
544(b) avoidance claim can be brought 8 9 and that the time period in
section 546(a) does not begin to run upon the filing of the petition but
upon the appointment of a trustee.9 0

186. Id. at 440-41.
187. Id. at 440.
188. 132 B.R. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
189. Id. at 125-26.
190. Id. at 124. In support of his holding, Judge Abramson made the following
observations:
Limitations periods are intended to apprise defendants of any adverse
claims against them by preventing plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights to
the detriment of the defendants. See Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,462
U.S. 345, 352, 76 L. Ed. 2d 628, 103 S. Ct. 2392 (1983). The Court notes that
this purpose is not unduly frustrated by giving the Trustee two years from the
date of his appointment to bring any fraudulent transfer actions. The Court
also notes that several compelling reasons support Congress' decision to provide trustees two years to commence any avoidance actions.
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In Hunt Judge Abramson considered not only Zilkha but also its
progeny, Which at that time included Sparmal Enterprises and

The most evident reason for providing trustees two years to bring avoidance actions is to ensure that the trustee has ample time to investigate any
potential claims and causes of action for the estate. In re Dry Wall Supply,
Inc., 111 B.R. at 936-37. In Dry Wall Supply, the Colorado District Court
stated that, "[w]ithout this two year period, a trustee who does not immediately determine what potential claims are available for the recovery of assets
may forever be barred from asserting those claims if the statute of limitations
expires early in the bankruptcy, or potentially before the trustee is even appointed." Id. at 937. The opportunity to investigate potential claims is not the
only consideration in allowing trustees an additional limitations period for filing such actions.
Another reason to provide trustees with a two year limitation period is the
way many bankruptcy proceedings progress. Often, a debtor will file a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 of the Code, and the case will remain open
for years before a Chapter 11 trustee is appointed or the case is converted to
Chapter 7. In such instances, unless the court orders otherwise, the creditors of
the estate are dependent upon the Debtor in Possession to bring any avoidance
claims on their behalf. Nebraska State Bank v. Jones, 846 F.2d 477, 478 (8th
Cir. 1988) (only trustees, and not creditors, have standing to bring § 544(b)
avoidance actions); See also In re Hansen, 114 B.R. at 932.
The very nature of Chapter 11 proceedings demonstrates the problems
with the Zilkha holding that the two year limitations period provided by
§ 546(a) begins to run from the date the bankruptcy petition is filed. In a
Chapter 11 case, the Debtor in Possession is concerned primarily with rehabilitating the company by developing a confirmable plan of reorganization. The
Debtor in Possession negotiates with the creditors of the estate regarding the
treatment they will receive under the plan, and ultimately, it is the creditors
who vote to accept or reject the plan. The Debtor in Possession may decide
during this negotiation period to compromise, settle, or abandon any avoidance
actions. Therefore, even though both a Debtor in Possession and a trustee have
fiduciary responsibilities to the estate, the recovery of preferential transfers is
more likely to occur with a trustee.
Furthermore, the Debtor in Possession has less incentive to bring an
avoidance action, since the Debtor is the one who made the preferential transfer in the first place. Perlstein v. Saltzstein (In re AOV Indus., Inc.), 62 B.R.
968, 974 (Bankr. D.C. 1986). Therefore, sound policy calls for providing trustees an additional two years from the date of appointment to bring any
§ 544(b) actions.
The Court also points out that its holding is in accord with the general
policy of the Code to provide trustees broad avoidance powers to maximize the
value of the estate for the benefit of all creditors. See American Nat'l Bank of
Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d
1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1983). Furthermore, numerous courts have held that each
trustee appointed under the enumerated provisions of § 546(a) has two years
within which to commence avoidance actions. Smith v. Moody (In re Moody),
77 B.R. 566, 573-74 (S.D.Tex.1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir.1987) (limitations period under § 546(a) runs anew with each successive trustee appointed).
Id. at 124-25 (footnote omitted).
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Coastal Group. Judge Abramson concluded that the cases were decided wrongly and that "Congress made it perfectly clear that
§ 546(a)(1) applies only to trustees appointed under specifically enumerated sections of the Code."1" 1

191. Pate v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 136 B.R. 437, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991). The
court stated:
The decisions relied upon by the Defendants generally begin with a determination that § 546(a) is ambiguous, thereby allowing the courts to construe
the statute. Then, the courts generally follow a two-part analysis. First, the
courts equate a debtor-in-possession with a Chapter 11 trustee by citing
§ 1107(a) of the Code. In finding that § 546(a)(1) applies to debtors in possession, the Delaware bankruptcy court emphasized that the debtor-in-possession
is subject to any limitations applicable to a Chapter 11 trustee. In re Coastal
Group, Inc., 125 B.R. at 732.
Secondly, the courts address the issue of whether a debtor-in possession is
subject to the same two year statute of limitations as an appointed trustee.
The Tenth Circuit stated:
We do not believe that Congress intended to limit actions filed by an
appointed trustee to two years without making the same restriction apply to a debtor in possession who is the functional equivalent of an appointed trustee. Because of the virtual identity of function between a
trustee and a debtor in possession, there would be no reason to create a
different limitation period for the filing of actions by the two fiduciaries.
Moreover, when the balance of § 546 is considered, it is even more apparent that Congress intended for the word "trustee" to apply to a
debtor in possession, for every reference to actions brought by a trustee
contained in § 546 obviously applies to actions brought by a debtor in
possession. A contrary analysis would deprive § 546 of significance in
the majority of recovery actions filed in Chapter 11 cases.
Consequently, we construe § 546(a)(1) to apply to actions filed by a
debtor in possession, and we believe the period of limitation begins to
run from the date of the filing of a petition for reorganization under
chapter 11. We reach that conclusion because the debtor becomes a
debtor in possession on that date.
Zilkha, 920 F.2d at 1524. Although it has been followed by a few courts, Zilkha
is contrary to the majority of cases that have addressed § 546(a)(1). This
Court declines to follow the Zilkha analysis for the reasons set out below.
(b) The Statute is Unambiguous
Initially, this Court finds the wording of § 546(a)(1) unambiguous. If it
had intended for the word "trustee" to apply to a debtor-in-possession as the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals believed, Congress could have made it clear by
including the words "debtor-in-possession" or referring to the "date of the petition". [sic] Instead, Congress made it perfectly clear that § 546(a)(1) applies
only to trustees appointed under specifically enumerated sections of the Code.
Where the statute's language is unambiguous, the inquiry into the meaning of
the statute should begin and end with its language, and the Court's sole function is to enforce it according to its terms. United States v. Ron PairEnter.,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989), citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
485 (1917). This Court agrees with the district court in Korvettes, Inc. v.
Sanyo Elec., Inc. (In re Korvettes, Inc.), 67 B.R. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) that:
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Also, Judge Abramson found that Zilkha was inconsistent with the
Fifth Circuit's decision in MortgageAmerica Corp. v. American Fed-

eral Savings and Loan (In re MortgageAmerica Corp),'9 ' in which the
court stated that "the limitations period under section 546(a) should
commence consistent with the appointment of the trustee through a
'193
written order."
Judge Abramson's opinion is particularly persuasive because of its
observations about the distinction between a trustee and a debtor in
possession, which of course goes to the heart of the matter.
This Court also disagrees with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' view that § 546(a)(1) should apply to debtors in possession as
well as trustees because of the "virtual identity of function between a
trustee and a debtor-in-possession." Zilkha, 920 F.2d at 1524. Although many of the powers and duties of a trustee are granted to or
imposed upon a debtor-in-possession, they are distinct entities, often
operating under different agendas. A debtor-in-possession is concerned primarily with rehabilitating the company by developing a
confirmable plan of reorganization. The debtor-in-possession negotiates with the creditors of the estate regarding the treatment they will
receive under the plan, knowing that ultimately it is the creditors who
vote to accept or reject the plan. The debtor-in-possession may decide
during this negotiation period to compromise, settle, or abandon any
avoidance actions, or may simply let potential claims lie until after a
plan is confirmed.
A Chapter 11 trustee, however, is primarily interested in obtaining the maximum return possible for the estate's creditors. In order to achieve this result, a trustee generally will be more diligent in
pursuing any possible avoidance actions. Even though both a debtorin-possession and a trustee have fiduciary responsibilities to the estate, a trustee is more likely to pursue voidable transfers. Further-

[a]t the time Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, several
cases had interpreted subsection 546(a)(1)'s two year time bar as starting to run only after a trustee is appointed, and as inapplicable to debtors in possession. Congress' failure to amend subsection 546(a)(1) to include debtors in possession supports the view that that subsection does
not apply to them. See Air Transport Association of America v.
PATCO, 667 F.2d 316, 321 (2d Cir. 1981) (court can "presume that Congress is aware of settled judicial constructions of existing law ... and
that it intends to retain those remedies that it has left in place"), cited
in In re Choice Vend, supra, 49 B.R. at 721.
In re Korvettes, 67 B.R. at 733.
Id. at 446-47 (parallel citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
192. 831 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
193. Id. at 98; see also Chapman v. Cardell Cabinets, Inc. (In re Nash Phillips/
Copus-Houston, Inc.), 114 B.R. 466 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that for purposes
of § 546 a trustee is appointed on the date the order approving the appointment is entered on the docket unless the order indicates a nunc pro tunc appointment).
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more, while a trustee is specifically required to investigate the affairs
of the debtor and file a statement of the results of such investigation,
including any causes of action available to the estate, a debtor-in-possession is not required to perform such duties. Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that a debtor-in-possession is the "functional
equivalent" of an appointed trustee is theoretically correct, but not in
synch with real life.
Furthermore, a debtor-in-possession has less incentive to bring an
avoidance action, since the debtor is the one who made the questioned
transfer in the first place. This rationale clearly applies in this case. It
is doubtful that the Debtors in Possession would have any incentive to
bring any of the claims alleged in the Complaints if the Debtors made
the alleged transfers to their relatives and affiliates. Therefore, sound
policy justifies Congress having provided trustees two years from the
date of appointment to bring any avoidance actions, while not limiting
all avoidance actions to two years from the petition date. This Court
concludes that the Zilkha line of cases are incorrect in holding that
the two year limitations period in § 546(a)(1) applies to debtors in
19
possession. "
Turning to the applicability of the state statutes of limitations,
Judge Abramson felt that such statutes were relevant only to the issue
of whether the claim was time barred prior to bankruptcy. If it was
not, then section 546(a) "supersedes the state statute of limitations"
and controls "since it provides a specific time within which a § 544
claim can be brought." 19 5 Moreover, Judge Abramson went on to hold
that even those fraudulent transfer claims that would have been time
barred prior to the filing of the bankruptcy cases were not subject to
state statutes of limitations because state statutes of limitations do not
run against the federal government. 196 Because the United States had
an allowable unsecured claim in Hunt and was in a position to set
aside the transfers in question, the running of the statute of limitations
under the UFCA was not a defense. The UFTA attempts to reverse
this rule by providing that the expiration of the prescribed period
"bars the right rather than the remedy on expiration of the statutory
periods prescribed."'' 97 Under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
however, the representative of creditors (the trustee or debtor in pos-

194. Hunt, 136 B.R. at 447-48 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
195. Id. at 450.
196. Id. at 450-51; accord United States v. Parker House Sausage Co., 344 F.2d 787,
788 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (holding that state statutes of limitations do not run
against the IRS); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 583 (M.D. Pa.
1983), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); see Kennedy, supra note 36, at 684.
197. UNri. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 642 (1991); see id.
§ 9 cmt. 1, 7A U.L.A. at 665-66.
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session) steps into the shoes of the United States of America and
therefore is not bound by state statutes of limitations.198
Judge Abramson had previously ruled in Lynn v. NCNB Texas
National Bank, N.A. (In re Corland Corp.)9 ' that the state statute of
limitations controlled, but that section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
extended the state limitations period to at least two years after the
filing of the bankruptcy case. Judge Abramson had expressly rejected
the argument that section 546(a) controlled, concluding that section
546(a) "merely acts as an additional limitation period in respect of a
trustee's ability to bring certain avoidance actions.

' 20 0

However, in

Topcor Judge Abramson backed off his holding in Corland,and at the
time of Hunt, Judge Abramson was of the opinion that section 546(a)
controlled the time limitations on avoidance actions brought under sec-

198. The Hunt court stated:
Plaintiffs are asserting avoidance actions on behalf of the estate for the
benefit of all creditors (including the IRS). See American Nat'l. Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266,
1275 (5th Cir. 1983) (the trustee in an avoidance action acts for the benefit of
all creditors). It is well settled that the United States is not bound by state
statutes of limitation. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940). Furthermore, the government utilizes state law in an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. Therefore, the question is whether a trustee, or similar party
such as Plaintiffs as representatives of the estates in this proceeding, who acquires the status of an actual unsecured creditor for purposes of § 544(b) is
immune from state statutes of limitations when utilizing the status of the
United States as an unsecured creditor under § 544(b).
Section 544(b) of the Code creates a power of avoidance in a trustee to
avoid any transfer that an actual unsecured creditor of the debtor as of the
date of the petition could have avoided. For purposes of the dismissal motions,
the Court must accept as true Plaintiffs' allegations in the Complaints that the
United States of America was an actual unsecured creditor of the Debtors as of
the petition date. Kaiser Aluminum, 677 F.2d at 1050. Furthermore, § 544(b)
permits a trustee to "stand in the shoes of a creditor" to assert any state law
claims that a creditor may have. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 845 (9th
Cir.1988). Therefore, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs are not barred by the
applicable state statutes of limitations since they acquired the status of the
United States pursuant to § 544(b) of the Code. United States v.Gleneagles
Investment Co., Inc., 565 F.Supp. 556, 583 (M.D. Pa. 1983), afl'd sub. noma.,
United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, McClellan Realty Co. v. United States, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987) (trustee's
claim asserted on behalf of the United States was not barred by the state statute of limitations since the trustee was empowered to assert the rights of the
United States as a creditor). Finally, if a transfer is avoidable at all by any
creditor, it is avoidable in full for all creditors. Abramson v. Boedeker, 379
F.2d 741, 748 n.16 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967).
Hunt, 136 B.R. at 450-51 (parallel citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
199. Adv. No. 388-3529 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 1989).
200. Id. at 17.
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tions 544(a), 548, and 550(a). Thus, he concluded that the language of
section 108(a) controls only those causes of action owned by the debtor
prior to bankruptcy. Section 108(a) provides that if the applicable
state law sets a time "within which the debtor may commence an action, and such period has not expired before" the bankruptcy petition
is filed, the trustee can bring the action before the latter of the end of
the applicable state law time period or two years after the case is
filed. 20' Clearly, section 108(a) relates only to actions that may be initiated by the debtor. Fraudulent transfer actions under state law or section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which only the trustee can bring, are
not actions that could be commenced by the debtor prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy case. Thus, Judge Abramson recognized the error he
had made in Corland, corrected his position in Topcor, and reemphasized the correct rule in Hunt.
VI.

BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION

546(e): A SAFE

HARBOR FOR

LEVERAGED BUYOUTS?

It has been less than ten years since the Gleneagles case lit up the
corporate firmament.2' 0 In the six years that have passed since the
Third Circuit's affirmance of most of the district court's rulings in its
three Gleneagles decisions, 2 03 much has taken place in the world of
fraudulent transfers and LBOs. Although some courts have been reluctant to apply fraudulent transfer law to LBOs, 20 4 it is now well accepted that the UFCA, UFTA, and section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code apply to LBOs.0 5 In adversary proceedings that arose in the Kai-

201. 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1988).
202. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
203. United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 584 F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Pa. 1984); United
States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 571 F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1983); United States v.
Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983), afl'd sub nom. United States v.
Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005
(1987).
204. See Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 77 B.R. 754, 759-60
(C.D. Cal. 1987), affd sub nom. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); Credit
Managers Assoc. v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1986). This hostility is
shared by a few commentators. See Douglas G. Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency
Costs and Leveraged Buyouts, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1990); Douglas G; Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829,
850-55 (1985).
205. Many cases and much commentary recognize the applicability of laws governing fraudulent transfers to leveraged buyouts. See Lippi v. City Bank, 955 F.2d 599
(9th Cir. 1992); Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 732 F. Supp.
1315 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Weiboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd sub nom.
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ser Steel Chapter 11 case, however, the Tenth Circuit recently closed
the door to recovery in bankruptcy from 2stockholders
who are stock07
brokers 20° or represented by stockbrokers.
The Kaiser Steel litigation involved an LBO merger approved in
January, 1984, and effective in February, 1984. On the effective date of
the merger Kaiser's stockholders were required to tender shares to
Kaiser's disbursing agent in exchange for cash and preferred stock of
the new company. Because Kaiser was listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, most of its stock was in the possession of a clearing agency
that received the cash and preferred stock from the disbursing agent.
The clearing agency in turn transferred the cash and preferred stock to
the accounts of its participants, which included brokers and other financial intermediaries. Eventually the beneficial owners of the Kaiser
stock received the LBO proceeds.0

United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Steph v. Branch, 255 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Okla. 1966), af'd, 389
F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1968); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating
Co.), 91 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser
Steel Corp), 87 B.R. 154 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. Security Pac.
Business Credit, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 70 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987);
David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73 (1985); Richard M. Cieri et al., An Introduction to Legal and PracticalConsiderations in the Restructuring of Troubled Leveraged Buyouts, 45 Bus. LAW. 333 (1989); Matthew T. Kirby
et al., Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged Buyout Lending, 43 Bus. LAW. 27
(1987); David A. Murdoch et al., Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Transfers: Life
After Gleneagles, 43 Bus. LAW. 1 (1987); Queenan, supra note 39, passim; Sherwin, supra
note 39, passim; Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and Going Under: Leveraged
Buyouts and the FraudulentConveyance Problem, 63 ND. L.J. 781 (1988); Kevin J. Liss,
Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491
(1987), There has not yet been a reported decision under the UFTA, but there is no
reason why the result would be otherwise.
206. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990)
(Kaiser1). For critical commentary on Kaiser I, see Jane E. Kiker, Comment, Judicial
Repeal of Fraudulent Conveyance Laws: Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co.,
913 F.2d 8465 (10th Cir. 1990), 14 HAMLINE L. REv. 453 (1991) and William C. Rand,
Comment, In re Kaiser Steel Corporation: Does Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code
Apply to a Fraudulent Conveyance Made in the Form of an LBO Payment?, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 87 (1991) (criticizing the decision in Kaiser I as unjustly protecting stockholders at the expense of creditors, mistaking congressional intent, and incorrectly relying on cases inapplicable to the equity securities market).
207. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d
1230 (10th Cir. 1991) (Kaiser I1), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992). For a case holding
that § 546(e) does not bar the avoidance of LBO payments to stockholders, see Weiboldt
Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 131 B.R. 655, 663-65 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citing Neil M. Garfinkel, Comment, No Way Out: Section 546(e) is no Escape for the Public Shareholder of a
Failed LBO, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L, REV. 51).
208. The Tenth Circuit capsulized the process as follows:
Most of the common stock was in the possession of Depository Trust Coin-
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Kaiser filed a Chapter 11 case in 1987 and initiated an adversary
proceeding seeking to recover $162 million in cash and preferred stock
distributed under the LBO plan. The initial lawsuit named as defendants the "street name shareholders" of the Kaiser stock. A second action was filed after discovery from the initial broker defendants disclosed the names of the beneficial owners of Kaiser stock. The second
action asserted the same fraudulent conveyance theories but joined as
defendants a large number of the beneficial owners. The district court
withdrew the reference of the adversary proceedings and consolidated
the cases with other adversary proceedings related to Kaiser's LBO.
Before the withdrawal of the reference, several brokers moved for
summary judgment on the basis that as to shares not beneficially
owned, the brokers were "mere conduits" rather than initial transferees and were therefore not liable under section 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 20 9 Also, the brokers interjected section 546(e), which was
enacted shortly before the Kaiser LBO. Their defense was that section
546(e) exempts settlement payments from recovery in section 544(b)
and section 548(a)(2) actions. Therefore, as a matter of law the brokers
were not liable because the benefits of the LBO were received by the
brokers as settlement payments.21 0
Bankruptcy Judge Matheson denied the brokers' motion for summary judgment21 but was reversed by the district court on the grounds
that the brokers were mere conduits and section 546(e) precluded recovery.212 The Tenth Circuit affirmed but solely on the ground that the
distributions to the stockbrokers were settlement payments exempt

pany ("DTC"), a securities clearing agency acting as depository. After the
merger, DTC tendered the [Kaiser stock] certificates to Bank of America [the
disbursing agent] and received the payments of LBO consideration [the cash
and preferred stock]. DTC then transferred these payments to the accounts of
its participants, including brokers and other financial intermediaries. These intermediaries, in turn, either disbursed the payments to their customers who
were the beneficial owners of Kaiser Steel stock or retained the payments if
they themselves were the beneficial owners. Some shares were exchanged
through securities clearing agencies other than DTC, and since DTC stopped
handling trades of Kaiser Steel shares prior to the effective date of the LBO,
some financial intermediaries and beneficial owners were required to tender
their shares directly to Bank of America.
Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1235-36.
209. See Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 B.R.
514, 517-21 (D. Colo.), aff'd sub nom. Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990).
210. See id. at 521-22.
211. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs, 105 B.R. 639, 653-54 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989), rev'd
sub nom. Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 B.R. 514
(D. Colo.), aff'd sub nom. Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990).
212. See Kaiser Steel Resources, 110 B.R. at 519-21, 521-22.
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from recovery as fraudulent conveyances under section 546(e). 21 3
In Kaiser I the Tenth Circuit dealt with the remaining issue,
whether section 546(e), which provides that "the trustee may not avoid
a transfer that is a. . .settlement payment. . . made by or to a...
stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency, 2 1 4 protected the beneficial owners of the Kaiser stock. The opinion summarized Kaiser's arguments on appeal as follows:
First, it maintains that these payments are not "settlement payments." Second, it insists that even if the payments are settlement
payments, payments made "by or to" one of the enumerated entities
are protected under section 546(e) only to the extent the recipient is a
participant in the clearance and settlement system (i.e., a stockbroker,
financial institution, clearing agency, or some other participant). Settlement payments received by
an "equity security holder," according
21
to Kaiser, are not protected. 5
The court observed that "settlement payment" encompasses all types
of payments in light of the broad definition under section 741(8) and
that it is necessary to interpret settlement payment "as it is plainly
understood within the securities industry."21 6 The court recognized
that two opportunities for a settlement arise in a typical securities
trade and that these settlements involve two corresponding sets of
guarantees. The first, the so-called "street-side settlement," occurs between brokers and the clearing agency, and the second, the "customer'217
side settlement. . . occurs between the broker and its customer.
Kaiser argued that the term "settlement payment" in section
546(e) only applies to routine purchases and sales of securities, and not
to an "extraordinary securities transaction" like an LBO.2 18 However,
the Tenth Circuit observed that neither section 546(e) nor section
741(8) is limited on its face to routine purchases and sales of securities.

213. Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990). This holding did not determine
whether the ultimate recipients of the LBO proceeds, the beneficial owners of the Kaiser
stock, would have to disgorge the proceeds. That issue was resolved by the Tenth Circuit
approximately four months later in Kaiser IL.In Kaiser I the Tenth Circuit did not
reach the issue because it held that brokers acting on behalf of third parties were protected by § 546(e). The Kaiser II court noted that as a result of Kaiser I, "Kaiser...
abandoned all claims against the appellees [brokers] in this case insofar as they acted in
conduit/financial intermediary capacities. Therefore, all appellees remaining before us
are shareholders or brokers that beneficially owned the Kaiser Steel shares tendered in
connection with the LBO." Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1236.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (Supp. II 1990).
215. Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1236-37.
216. Id. at 1237 (citing McCarthy v. Bronson, 111 S.Ct. 1737, 1740 (1991); Shell Oil
Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 25 (1988)).
217. Id. at 1237-38.
218. Id. at 1239.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss4/5

46

Smith and Kennedy: Fraudulent
Transfers and Obligations: Issues of Current Interest
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
1992]
The court apparently believed that the term "settlement payment" is
broad enough to include payments received in transactions other than
routine purchases and sales of securities. The court relied primarily on
the fact that section 362(b)(6) excepts from the automatic stay a
setoff by a... stockbroker... of any mutual debt and claim under
or in connection with ... securities contracts, as defined in section
741(7)... that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for
a margin payment ... or settlement payment ... arising out of...
securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by
or due from such ... stockbroker
... to margin, guarantee, secure,
21 9
or settle ... securities contracts.
The court reasoned that if Congress had intended what Kaiser argued, Congress would have used the same language in section 546(e)
that it used in section 362(b)(6). 2" However, the settlement payment
in section 546(e) is narrower than the "settlement payment. . . arising
out of . . .securities contracts" in section 362(b)(6) because the language in section 362(b)(6) indicates that Congress intended to expand
the settlement payment exception from the stay to include loans of
securities in addition to purchases and sales of securities. Therefore, if
any conclusion can be drawn from the use of the phrase "arising out of
. ..securities contracts" in section 362(b)(6), it is that a "settlement
payment" alone, which is what Section 546(e) addresses, does not include payments that arise from loans of securities. Thus, the Kaiser II
court improperly adopted a broad definition of settlement payment for
22 1
purposes of section 546(e).
Also, the court concluded that an LBO is a securities transaction.
While the leveraged buy out may not be a "routine" securities
trade, at least as viewed by Kaiser, we cannot deny what in substance
took place here. The LBO was a securities transaction, varying only in
form from the various other ways in which a shareholder's equity interest can be sold. The former Kaiser Steel shareholders effectively
sold their equity interests to the new investors in exchange for money
and a continuing stake in the new entity as preferred shareholders. In
settlement of that transaction, the Kaiser Steel shareholders tendered
their shares and received payment. These payments were "settlement
22
payments.""'

219. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990).
220. Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1239 (citing Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
840, 846-847 (1991) (stating that if particular language is used in one section of a statute
but omitted in another, Congress is presumed to have acted "'intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion' ") (quoting Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983)))).
221. See id. at 1239-40.
222. Id. (citing Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846, 850 (10th Cir. 1990)).
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A student commentator, in a recent article analyzing Kaiser I, disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions and proposed a "framework. .. to serve as a
guide as 3 to the scope and applicability of sections 546(e) and
741(8).

"

122

Settlement implies some sort of connection to an exchange or trade,
and because Congress considered section 546(e) within the context of
insulating the workings of the securities markets (the trading or exchanging of securities), that should also be the contextual framework
in which the scope of "settlement payment" is examined.
In determining, then, whether or not a particular flow of funds
between a customer and a broker is indeed a "settlement payment"
for purposes of section 546(e), the proper question should be: "Is this
generally the type of transfer whose protection is necessary to the
smooth working of the securities markets?" Where LBO payments to
public shareholders are concerned, the answer to that question is
"No." The inviolability of payments to shareholders is simply not basic to the operation of the clearance and settlement systems. Those
systems will be only incidentally affected, if at all, if former shareholders are required to return payments they received in an LBO.
Neither the system of guarantees nor the solvency of participants in
the chain is threatened by a legal order in which payments to the
shareholders by their brokers are subject to recovery by a trustee in
bankruptcy. Thus, while the flows of funds to and between financial
intermediaries in the clearance and settlement chain must be protected in order to insure the stability of those systems, funds flowing
from the intermediaries to the shareholders do 22not
require protection,
4
and section 546(e) should therefore not apply.
The Tenth Circuit found comfort in the "symmetry of treatment"
that its decision accorded to those stockholders who sold their stock
before the LBO tender date and those who tendered their shares pur225
suant to the LBO plan.
[T]hose shareholders who tendered their shares one day after the
LBO and received the LBO consideration are treated just the same
under the Code as shareholders who sold their shares in the market
one day prior to the LBO and received a settlement payment reflecting the market value of the LBO consideration. Neither type of investor will be forced to disgorge ... .228
However, these are entirely different situations. The consideration in

223. Garfinkel, supra note 207, at 65-66.
224. Id. at 66-67.
225. Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1240 n.10.
226. Id. at 1240.
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the LBO flowed from the target corporation (the debtor) and constitutes a fraudulent transfer because there was no reasonable equivalent
value returned to the target corporation. The securities traded one day
before the LBO are entirely different. Someone in the market place
purchased these securities and paid with consideration that flowed
from that purchaser, not the target of the LBO. There is no basis at all
for setting aside these pre-LBO transactions, and little more than the
court's desire for symmetry can explain the court's reasoning. No public policy is served by excepting from avoidance profits enjoyed by
those who waited on a further rise in the market just to reach a symmetry with those who took their profits early.
Nonetheless, the court believed that a "symmetry of treatment"
was justified not only by "the plain notion of 'settlement'" but also by
Congress's decision to promote "finality," "'speed and certainty in
Furthermore, it found its
resolving complex financial transactions.' ,2217
earlier Kaiser I decision consistent with section 546(e)'s goal of protecting "'the nation's financial markets from the instability caused by
the reversal of settled securities transactions.' ",228 These concerns seem
beside the point, however, because Kaiser limited its prayer for recovery to the beneficial owners. A recovery from the beneficial owners
would have had no impact on the nation's financial markets, other
than perhaps to dampen the enthusiasm for LBOs, nor would it have
slowed down any complex financial transactions. Nonetheless, the
court somehow concluded that its holding was "supported by Congress'
policy of promoting the health of the clearance and settlement system,
which by all 9accounts is one of the fundamental aims of the 546(e)
exemption.

'22

227. Id. at 1240 n.10 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 484, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 223, 224).
228. Id. (quoting Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Kaiser Steel
Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 B.R. 514, 522 (D.Colo.), aff'd,
sub nom. Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990))); see also Garfinkel, supra note 207, at
61-65 (discussing congressional concerns about the effect of the avoiding powers on the
securities market).
229. Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1240 n.10. The SEC's brief in Kaiser I asserted this
improbable threat to the securities market: If brokerage customers are forced to return
LBO payments they might not pay the brokers, who will fail and cause a ripple effect
that would cripple the market. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 3035, Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990). One commentator analyzed the SEC's brief
as follows:
Recognizing the improbability of the above scenario, the SEC then goes on
to make two other arguments in favor of § 546(e)'s applicability. The first is a
plain meaning argument: The section says what it says and should therefore be
applied. Contrary to the SEC's assertion, the section is far from clear, and because of the import of a decision either way in this area, it seems judicially
irresponsible not to consider the role the provision was intended to play in the
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Also, the Tenth Circuit held that those brokers who were beneficial owners of Kaiser shares were exempted from avoidance recovery
by the "clear" reference to stockbrokers in section 546(e). 230 Kaiser ar-

gued that these brokers acted as equity security holders, who are not
exempted from avoidance recovery in section 546(e), and not as stockbrokers because a stockbroker is not a stockbroker unless it acts for a
customer. 231 The court held, however, that the plain language of the
statute protects all stockbrokers regardless of the nature of their ownership. "Certainly, we cannot say that the clear application is absurd,
given the fact that disruption in the securities industry-an inevitable
result if leveraged buy outs can freely be unwound years after they
occurred-is also a harm the statute was designed to avoid. 2' 3

2

In con-

clusion, the court stated that it was "not convinced [its holding] leaves
the trustee remediless by way of a suit for damages, or some similar
2' 33
device, against specific individuals or institutions for unlawful acts.

context of the securities markets. "It says what it says" should not carry a
great deal of weight at all, much less the day.
The second argument the SEC presents is that to find shareholders liable
in general would undermine investor confidence in the market and increase
market volatility. Therefore, § 546(e) should be read to insulate shareholders.
This argument essentially asserts that investors should not be required to examine the validity of the transactions they effect in the marketplace. In today's
world, a rule which promotes shareholder passivity and ignorance does not
seem to further any compelling purpose.
Capital formation and investor confidence should not be significantly affected by a legal environment that requires an investor to look before he or she
leaps. Shareholders reap the benefits of these buyouts in the form of large premiums when they approve the transaction. They should similarly be exposed
to some of the risks. If fairness dictates that some shareholders should be exempted, then a way should be found to do that. But bending a relatively specific bankruptcy provision to serve as a blanket exemption in the name of investor confidence is both unwarranted and ill-advised.
Garfinkel, supra note 207, at 67 n.69.
230. Kaiser II, 953 F.2d at 1240-41.
231. Id. at 1240 n.11. Section 101(54) defines a stockbroker as a "person . . . with
respect to which there is a customer . . . and . . . that is engaged in the business of
effectuating transactions in securities." 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(A)-(B) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added).
232. Kaiser II, 953 F.2d at 1241.
233. Id. As explained in Kaiser's petition for certiorari, while the Kaiser decisions
may not have left Kaiser remediless, they did have a substantial adverse impact.
The increased cost and risk and reduction of monies available to fund retiree trusts is clear and immediate for Kaiser's creditors and retirees. The
Tenth Circuit concluded its decision with the point that Kaiser could still sue
specific individuals or institutions for unlawful acts. (App. A at 26A). Kaiser
has done so, pursuing and settling various claims, including one with the officers and directors who held a $25 million insurance policy that decreased
with each dollar spent by defense counsel, for $17 million. The retiree medical
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In determining whether stockbrokers qua stockbrokers were liable
for LBO payments, the Tenth Circuit in Kaiser I determined that the
phrase "settlement payment" included the receipt of proceeds from an
LBO. In Kaiser Ifthe question was not whether the payments could be
recovered from the stockbrokers qua stockbrokers, but whether the
payments could be recovered from the beneficial owners of Kaiser
stock, who in some cases were brokers. Kaiser took the position that
[s]ection 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, far from literally and unambiguously precluding collection from beneficial shareowners ... does

not preclude that collection at all. Equity security holders, defined in
Bankruptcy Code § 101(16), are not among the parties enumerated in
§ 546(e) to be exempt from fraudulent conveyance recovery. Stockthe scope of the statute when they
brokers themselves are not within
234
are also equity security holders.

In its Brief the SEC conceded that Congress did not intend to create a
safe harbor for LBOs by acknowledging that the "by or to" language in
section'546(e) was discussed only "in the context of payments between
brokers and payments between brokers and clearing agencies.

2 35

The

SEC also recognized that "protecting individual shareholders would
not necessarily further the exact purpose that led to the enactment of
Section 546(e)" and that "the hearings focused upon the system of
guarantees3 sthrough which the clearance and settlement process
operates.

2'

In the Congressional hearings on the 1982 amendment to section
546(e), Commissioner Bevis Longstreth testified for the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 23 7 He described the pending amendments as

"technical, clarifying, and minor substantive amendments to the new

trust has already exhausted all the net litigation proceeds it has received to
date, on benefits payments costing about $400,000 a month. Kaiser is still pursuing claims against accountants and an investment banker, but recognizes
that comparative negligence statutes and judgment reduction requirements of
the directors and officers' settlement may well reduce any collection from
them. Kaiser has claims against the Jacobs Group, including a $14 million
"greenmail" claim; $33 million of its claims against the Jacobs Group are for
monies distributed for their shares, however.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit at 29, Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (Nos. 90-1243, 1245)
(footnote omitted). The Supreme Court denied Kaiser's petition. 112 S.Ct. 3015 (1992).
234. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1, Kaiser I, 952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 901243, 90-1245), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992).
235. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 16 n.16, Kaiser I, 952
F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 90-1243, 90-1245), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 3015 (1992).
236. Id. at 15-16.
237. H.R. REP. No. 420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 584.
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Bankruptcy Code. '232 He stated that "[i]n brief, the Commission's position is that the preference, fraudulent transfer and stay provisions
can be interpreted to apply in harmful and costly ways to customary
methods of operation essential to the securities industry. 2 39 One of the
problems he noted was the fact that there were express provisions that
protected the commodities industry, but none that protected the securities industry. Commissioner Longstreth was concerned that this omission would give rise to an unfortunate inference that no protection was
intended for the securities industry.
The Commission was particularly concerned that the preference,
fraudulent transfer, and automatic stay provisions could have an adverse impact on the national clearance and settlement system. The
Commission's view was that the Bankruptcy Code created three
problems. First, the elimination of the reasonable cause to believe requirement from the preference provisions increased the number of securities transactions subject to preference avoidance. The solution was
to apply the commodities exemption, then in section 24
764(c),
to the se0
curities industry as well as the commodities industry.
The second problem noted by the Commission was a fraudulent
conveyance problem,
which is a problem closely analogous to the one arising under Section
547 and exists under Section 548 of the code related to fraudulent
transfers. Section 548 establishes another class of transfers by the
debtor which, in order to achieve equity among creditors, can be
avoided by the trustee. These include, among others, transfers of any
property of the debtor made within 1 year before the bankruptcy
where the debtor received less than "a reasonably equivalent value" in
exchange and was then insolvent or thereby became insolvent. Unfortunately, however, section 548(d)(2)(B) provides that a "commodity
broker ... that receives a margin payment ... takes for value."
Once again, this language by emphasizing that a commodities
margin payment is not subject to the trustee's avoiding powers, creates the inference that a functionally identical securities margin payment is subject to avoidance as a fraudulent transfer.24 1

238. Bankruptcy of Commodity and Securities Brokers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th

Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings].
239. Id. at 239.
240. To extend the protections afforded the commodities industry to the securities
industry, Congress repealed § 764(c) in 1982. Act of July 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-222,
§ 17(c), 96 Stat. 240. Congress then added what is now § 546(e) to the Code and
changed the definitions in § 741 to include securities margin and settlement payments.
Id. §§ 4, 8, 96 Stat. at 236, 237.

241. Hearings,supra note 238, at 240. Jack Nelson, President of National Securities
Clearing Corporation, stated that "the new uncertainty regarding fraudulent transfers
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The solution suggested and enacted was to extend the special treatment accorded commodities margin payments to securities margin and
settlement payments.242
A third problem was created by the automatic stay.
[The stay] would force a clearing agency or broker to obtain explicit
judicial permission to close out the open securities positions of an insolvent broker or customer. Once a broker or customer is insolvent,
the clearing agency-to take one example-will receive no further
mark-to-market or clearance fund payments, even if the market continues to move against the insolvent broker's net securities position.
At this point, the clearing agency can limit its loss exposure by
closing out that net position. The automatic stay would prevent such
a step until court permission could be obtained, by which time mounting losses may have rendered the agency itself insolvent, or at least
resulted in further losses.
The proposed amendments would extend and clarify section
362(b)(6) and other related provisions to make it clear that, in general, neither securities nor commodities brokers and clearing agencies
payments
can be stayed from exercising their rights to apply margin
24 3
to close out open positions of brokers and customers.
In response to Congressman Butler's question as to whether there
was a need for an amendment, Commissioner Longstreth said:
I think the answer-part answer-is that in the hashing out that

involves section 548 of the Code. Under previous law, it was clear that margin and markto-market payments did not constitute fraudulent transfers, since they were made for
the purpose of satisfying or securing a present or antecedent debt." Id. at 312. Section
548 created this uncertainty because prior to 1982 it deemed that only commodities broker margin payments were taken for value. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981)
(current version at 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1990)).
242. See Act of July 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-222, sec. 5, § 548(d)(2)(B), 96 Stat.
235, 236 (including margin and settlement payments received by stockbrokers within
those transfers deemed to be made for value) (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(d)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1990)).
243. Hearings,supra note 238, at 241. In its prepared statement, id. at 242-62, the
Securities and Exchange Commission made its concerns about the automatic stay perfectly clear:
I should add parenthetically that while one or even a few days' price
movement may not seem like problems of unacceptable magnitude, in times of
market volatility substantial sums can be involved. Thus, in the case of major
brokerage firms, losses resulting from net securities positions could run to millions of dollars on any single day. If such losses are suffered by a clearing
agency and, due to the operation of the automatic stay, are dramatically increased and must be absorbed by the solvent participants in the system, they
could result in a chain reaction of insolvencies and chaos in the securities
markets.
Id. at 258 (footnote omitted).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1992

53

South
Carolina
Law Review,
43, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 5[Vol. 43
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW
led to the code, the problems to which I have alluded were recognized
as problems to the commodities industry and solutions to these
problems are embedded in the code, but another industry closely
linked and very similar, if not indistinguishable in this area, was left
out. That would be bad enough without the negative inference, but
you have got the negative inference that is a powerful one, given a
code that is painfully detailed and carefully built word upon word, so
that inferences can easily be drawn, negative or positive, by
omissions.2 "'

In Kaiser I the court concluded that the 1982 amendment to section 546(e) expanded the market protection "beyond the ordinary

course of business to include margin and settlement payments to and
from brokers, clearing organizations, and financial institutions."' 245
Prior to the 1982 amendments, the predecessor of subsection (e), section 764(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,246 protected only
"the ordinary course of business in the [commodities] market. ' 247 Kaiser argued that the court in Kaiser I was incorrect in concluding that
Congress intended to extend market protections beyond the ordinary
course of business.
The "expansion" took the form of allowing, for the first time, the
prompt liquidation of an insolvent's securities and commodities contracts, unfettered by any stay, to minimize losses if the market were
to move sharply in the wrong direction. 11 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556. The
other provisions only "clarified" the existing Code protections, and
gave the same protections to participants in the securities market.
H.R. Rep. No. 97-420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 583-87. ("The new § 546([e]) reiterates the provisions of current § 764(c). The new section also encom-

244, Id. at 264-65. Theodore H. Focht, General Counsel for the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation, concurred that there was an ambiguity that needed clarification.
The proposed amendment to section 546 of the Bankruptcy Code would
prevent a trustee from avoiding a transfer which is a deposit made by or to a
commodities broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, or securities
clearing agency.
The word "deposit" is undefined. It is, in my view, too ambiguous a word
and might be used to defeat a trustee's attempt to recover a preferential transfer that should be recovered.
The committee report, I believe, could clarify this matter by making it
clear that a preferential payment which is neither a margin, mark-to-market or
settlement payment, nor a deposit to a clearing fund should continue to be
recoverable by a trustee as it is under existing law.
Id. at 285.
245. Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846, 849 (10th Cir. 1990).
246. 11 U.S.C. § 764(c) (Supp. V 1981) (repealed 1982).
247. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 392 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6348.
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passes both stockbrokers and securities clearing agencies."). Thus, the
same ordinary course of business protections were extended from the
commodities industry to the securities industry, but the protections
themselves were not expanded beyond ordinary course of business
transactions.4 8
Kaiser asserted that there was no evidence reflected anywhere that
the 1982 amendments were intended to include transactions like leveraged~buyouts, mergers, and dividend payments within the protection of
section 546(e). In the absence of any manifest congressional intention
to include such payments, Kaiser argued that the statute should not be
interpreted to apply beyond the situations mentioned in the legislative
history.249

248. Appellant's Opening Brief and Response to Order to Show Cause at 6, Kaiser
II, 952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 90-1243, 90-1245), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015
(1992).
249. The Court does not judicially legislate by interpreting settlement payment
only in the context defined by the industry in its publications and testimony to
Congress. Rather, it judicially legislates when it interprets beyond Congress'
intent, as evidenced by the information Congress considered when enacting the
law, into unchartered and unconsidered depths.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that statutes should not be
interpreted to cover situations unmentioned in the legislative history. In
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985), for example, the
petitioner argued that the proscription of "manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer" in Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act covered fully disclosed acts which manipulated the price of the takeover
target's stock. The Court said, "[n]owhere in the legislative history is there the
slightest suggestion that § 14(e) serves any purpose other than disclosure, or
that the term 'manipulative' should be read as an invitation to the courts to
oversee the substantive fairness of tender offers; the quality of any offer is a
matter for the marketplace." Id. at 11-12. The Court refused to broaden the
scope of the statute beyond the context evidenced in the legislative history to
an unconsidered context.
Similarly, in United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S.
534 (1940), the Court refused to give the ICC the power to regulate the qualifications and hours of service of employees, other than those employees concerned with the safety of operations. It said, "We are especially hesitant to
conclude that Congress intended to grant the Commission other than the customary power to secure safety in view of the absence in the legislative history
of the Act of any discussion of the desirability of giving the Commission broad
and unusual powers over all employees." Id. at 546-47. See also Heppner v.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 665 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1981), where the court
held that personal injury actions unrelated to the special environmental risks
created by the trans-Alaskan pipeline were not within the scope of the TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act. The Court said that "[a]n explicit denial in
the legislative history of the distant possibilities included within [the statutory
language's] sweep is not required. Instead we need only see if the purpose of
the Act, as revealed by the legislative history, confirms that the language
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In Kaiser I the court recognized that "Kaiser's position that section 546(e) was only intended to insulate from avoidance routine securities transactions is not without merit."2 50 The court did not, however,
respond to Kaiser's position that the statute should not be broadened
beyond the intent manifested in the legislative history, except to state
that "we will not interpret the term 'settlement payment' so narrowly
''25 1
as to exclude the exchange of stock for consideration in an LBO.
Also in Kaiser II, Kaiser argued that in order to be exempt from
preference avoidance section 546(e) settlement payments had to be
made by or to the enumerated entities. The enumerated entities include "a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker,
financial institution, or securities clearing agency," 252 but do not in'253
clude an "equity security holder.

Congress addressed and intended to protect only the brokers and
clearing agencies who stand behind the obligations of an insolvent
customer or broker to make settlement payments. The broker on behalf of the customer and the clearing agency on behalf of the broker
interpose themselves between the customers wishing to buy and sell
securities. The counterpart of a bankrupt customer, the beneficial
holder of the security sold to or brought from the bankrupt customer,
is likely unidentifiable. The clearing agencies net out stock positions
and cash in their broker members' accounts each day. On the date
when a bankrupt's broker settled his sale of a particular stock, the
broker could well have had no change in the number of that company's shares in its account at the clearing agency, or a decrease. It
could have had no change or a decrease in its cash account as well,

should not be read too broadly." 665 F.2d at 873.
Of the many transactions in which publicly traded companies and their
street name and beneficial shareholders can engage, Congress only addressed
securities contracts, those that were open and those that had been settled
when a brokerage company or its customer filed bankruptcy, in the Bankruptcy Code provisions bearing to any degree on this case. The "ripple effect"
of a customer or broker insolvency on the financial stability of clearing agencies and other brokers applies only in the "securities contract" context. Only
with securities contracts do the clearing agencies and brokers guarantee consummation. A corporate merger payment like Kaiser's is not within the scope
of risks Congress intended to protect. The Court does not judicially legislate by
restricting statutory language to the context Congress addressed.
Id. at 11-13 (footnote omitted).
250. Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846, 850 (10th Cir. 1990).
251. Kaiser II, 952 F.2d 1230, 1239 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015
(1992).
252. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (Supp. II 1990).
253. Appellant's Opening Brief and Response to Order to Show Cause at 14, Kaiser
II, 952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 90-1243, 90-1245), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 3015
(1992).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss4/5

56

Smith and Kennedy: Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations: Issues of Current Interest
19921
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
due to other transactions. Collection from customer counterparts to
trades, if they could somehow be identified, was never contemplated
because the brokers and clearing agencies were the true trading
partners.2"

Furthermore, because a stockbroker by definition must be acting for a
customer,"' section 546(e) clearly cannot insulate a payment to a
stockbroker in its capacity as an equity security holder. 21
The Tenth Circuit responded that "the statute is clear. The statute exempts payments made 'by or to' a stockbroker, financial institution, or clearing agency. Again, unless there is some reason to believe
the clear application is absurd or otherwise unreasonable, we can leave
our inquiry at that. 21 5 7 However, this did not answer Kaiser's assertion

requires a transaction in securithat the Code definition of stockbroker
25 8
ties done on behalf of a customer.

254. Id. at 14-15.
255. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (Supp. II 1990) ("[S]tockbroker means person . . .with
respect to which there is a customer ....").
256. For the relevant legislative history, see Hearings, supra note 238.
257. Kaiser 11, 952 F.2d at 1240 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (Supp. II 1990)). The
Bankruptcy Code sponsor's statements about the reason for including payments "by" as
well as "to" the enumerated parties, the insertion of the words "by or," and the deletion
of the phrase "made by a clearing organization" indicate that the Code's sponsors intended to bring these payments under § 764(c).
Mr. MATHIAS. "Am I correct in my understanding of the Senator's [Mr.
DeConcini's] statement that the intent of section 764 and section 548(d)(2) is
to provide that margin payments and settlement payments previously made
by a bankrupt to a commodity broker,forward contract merchant and by or to
a clearing organization are nonvoidable transfers by the bankrupt's trustee?"
MR. DECONCINI. "Yes."
124 CONG. REc. 34018 (1978) (emphasis added).
258. The opinion did address the issue further in a footnote:
It is difficult to imagine, for instance, how Congress could recognize that a
settlement payment may be made by a stockbroker to its customer (whether
that customer is bankrupt or not), see Appellant's Opening Brief at 16 (citing
reference in legislative history to "settlement payment owed to a customer"),
and not realize that section 546(e), which on its face protects settlement payments by a stockbroker, is likely to be read by a court to protect settlement
payments by a stockbroker to its customer.
Further, Kaiser's claim that § 546(e) does not protect brokers trading on
their own account is clearly wrong. Kaiser argues that such brokers are "equity
security holders" and not "stockbrokers." It notes as well that "stockbrokers"
must have "customers." 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(A). However, the definition of
"stockbroker" was intentionally fashioned to include dealers who "effect[]
transactions in securities . . . with members of the general public, from or for
such person's own account," 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(B) (emphasis added), and
"customer," as used in the Code is a term of art, broadly defined in § 741(2) to
"include anybody that interacts with the [broker] in a capacity that concerns
securities transactions." S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1978), re-
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On the key issue of whether a settlement payment, which is not
defined in the Code, includes consideration paid to shareholders for
their stock in connection with a LBO,2 59 the court concluded that it
did. The court unequivocally stated that "we must interpret the term
'settlement payment' as it is plainly understood within the securities
industry."260 But the court did not do so!
"Settlement" is a word with meaning "in the securities trade"; it
is not all-encompassing. Rather, in the numerous industry publications cited by the Tenth Circuit, "settlement" is defined as the completion of a securities transaction, which in turn is defined as a
"trade". Neither the Bankruptcy Code provision nor a single industry
publication which any of the parties has unearthed applies the word
"settlement" to one-time mandatory redemptions or cash mergers
where corporate assets are distributed to shareholders, rather than a
market trade where shares and money are exchanged between buyers
and sellers. Moreover, the understanding of settlement payment "in
the securities trade" is evidenced by Kaiser's uncontroverted affidavit
from a securities, industry expert, stating that the "mandatory redemption of Kaiser common stock as part of the leveraged buyout was
not a 'settlement payment' as that term is commonly used in the se-

printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5886. The customer requirement was apparently designed only to prevent employees of brokers from claiming the benefits of certain Code provisions. See S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5813.
Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1240 n.11.
259. Section 546(e) refers to § 741(8) for the meaning of settlement payment. However, as Kaiser pointed out in its brief in Kaiser II, this is a nondefinition.
As Gertrude Stein might say, "a settlement payment is a settlement payment is a settlement payment." But litigation is settled, debts are settled,
trades are settled, and settlement payments are made. When a brokerage customer is delinquent on amounts due to a broker, and enters into a settlement
agreement to pay monthly installments before or after litigation, are the payments to the broker settlement payments exempt from preference or fraudulent conveyance attack? Are payments pursuant to a pre-bankruptcy workout
agreement to a bank, a "financial institution," settlement payments which are
likewise insulated? What if the debt arises out of the financing of a stock
purchase? See In re Edelsberg, 101 B.R. 386, 389 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (garnishment on debt for stock purchases not settlement payment). The Third Circuit said the definition of settlement payments is "extremely broad," but
breadth does not stretch to infinity. There are hybrids of Gertrude Stein's
roses; there are hybrids of settlement payments. When the term is used in a
statute, it must be limited to the context Congress addressed. That context
was simply and only "securities contracts," trades guaranteed by brokers and
clearing agencies.
Appellant's Opening Brief and Response to Order to Show Cause at 7-8, Kaiser 11, 952
F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 90-1243, 90-1245), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992).
260. Kaiser 11, 952 F.2d at 1237.
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VII.

THE

261

FDIC's

FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT UNDER

F.I.R.R.E.A.

As a legislative expression of outrage at the frauds perpetrated by
the participants in the activities that precipitated the dramatic decline
of the savings and loan industry, Congress has enacted a special fraudulent transfer law for the benefit of the victims of that decline. 6 2
Sometimes identified as part of the Crime Control Act of 1990,283 subparagraph (17) of section 1821(d) of Title 12 authorizes the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, or another appointee of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision,
to act as a conservator or receiver for any insured depository institution in avoiding a fraudulent transfer made or obligation incurred by
an "institution-affiliated party" or a debtor of the institution.2 ' Sec-

261. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit at 12, Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (Nos. 90-1243,
1245) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court denied the petition. 112 S. Ct. 3015
(1992).
262. Congressman Charles E. Schumer, sponsor of the law, gave this brief account of
relevant history:
Since a year ago last August, when the [Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989] became effective, the losses from failed financial institutions have ballooned. Reports of criminal activity and grossly
excessive behavior that led to the dramatic decline of the savings and loan
industry have proliferated. Title XXV responds to the public outcry to put to
justice those who defrauded the savings and loan industry by providing Federal regulating agencies, Federal prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies
with additional tools to combat fraud and abuse affecting financial institutions.
Subtitle B of the legislation, which is aimed at protecting assets from
wrongful disposition, expands the authority of the Attorney General, conservators, receivers or liquidating agents and Federal banking agencies to enjoin the
dissipation of assets wrongfully obtained.
Subtitle B further expands the power of conservators, receivers or liquidating agents to void fraudulent transfers ..
136 CONG. REc. E 3684 (1990).
263. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789-4968 (1990). The statute was enacted as
title 25 of the Crime Control Act of 1990, entitled the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank
Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990. Id. at 4859-88.
264. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17) (Supp. II 1990). The statute provides as follows:
(A) In general
The Corporation, as conservator or receiver for any insured depository institution, and any conservator appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency
or the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision may avoid a transfer of any
interest of an institution-affiliated party, or any person who the Corporation or
conservator determines is a debtor of the institution, in property, or any obli-
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tion 1821(d)(17) contains an extraordinary and questionable grant of
superiority for the rights it creates over "any rights of a trustee or any
other party (other than any party which isa Federal agency) under
Title 11. ' '265 The statute is not well drafted and presents several troublesome issues apart from those involving its relationship to the Bankruptcy Code and other legislation dealing with fraudulent transfers.
First, the legislation contains its own statute of limitations; it applies only to transfers and obligations incurred within five years of the
date the FDIC or other agency as conservator or receiver is appointed.2 6 It has been held, however, that section 1821(d)(17) applies
retroactively to transfers made before its enactment. 28 7 A transfer or

gation incurred by such party or person, that was made within 5 years of the
date on which the Corporation or conservator was appointed conservator or
receiver if such party or person voluntarily or involuntarily made such trapsfer
or incurred such liability with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the insured depository institution, the Corporation or other conservator, or any other
appropriate Federal banking agency.
(B) Right of recovery
To the extent a transfer is avoided under subparagraph (A), the Corporation or any conservator described in such subparagraph may recover, for the
benefit of the insured depository institution, the property transferred, or, if a
court so orders, the value of such property (at the time of such transfer) from(i) the initial transferee of such transfer or the institution-affiliated
party or person for whose benefit such transfer was made; or
(ii) any immediate or mediate transferee of any such initial
transferee.
(C) Rights of transferee or obligee
The Corporation or any conservator described in subparagraph (A) may
not recover under subparagraph (B) from(i) any transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith; or
(ii) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such
transferee.
(D) Rights under this paragraph
The rights under this paragraph of the Corporation and any conservator
described in subparagraph (A) shall be superior to any rights of a trustee or
any other party (other than any party which is a Federal agency) under Title
11.
Id.
265. Id. § 1821(d)(17)(D).
266. Id. § 1821(d)(17)(A).
267. FDIC v. Yemelos, 778 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. La. 1991). In Yemelos the court noted
that the Supreme Court has not resolved tensions between two lines of decisions dealing
with the retroactive application of statutes but, relying principally on Bradley v. School
Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974), the court decided in favor of retroactivity
because, frankly, it yields the result which the Court finds to be the just, logical, and proper decision in this instance, and because the Court believes that
Congress, in enacting the statute, intended that the statute be applied retroactively to enable the FDIC to protect its solvency so that it is available to pro-
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obligation must be made or incurred "with the intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud the insured depository institution" in order to be voidable. 268 The absence of any language or legislative history suggesting
that Congress intended to render voidable a constructively fraudulent
transfer or obligation of the kind described in section 548(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code,269 sections 4(a)(2) and 5 of the UFTA, 270 and sec-

tions 4, 5, and 6 of the UFCA271 predictably has generated dispute
about whether such a transfer or obligation is vulnerable to avoidance
under section 1821(d)(17) .272

tect the deposits of the insured depositors in this nation's banks.
Yemelos, 778 F. Supp. at 332. The court added that "§ 1821(d)(17) is really a procedural
tool for the FDIC, as it does not confer any substantive rights which it did not already
possess by virtue of the fraudulent conveyance avoidance rules of the United States
bankruptcy laws and the action to annul under Louisiana state law." Id. at 333.
268. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
269. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
270. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT §§ 4(a)(2), 5, 7A U.L.A. 652-53, 657 (1985).
271. Id. §§ 4, 5, 6, 7A U.L.A. at 474, 504, 507.
272. The dispute has arisen in at least four reported cases. The most explicit consideration of this issue appears in In re Colonial Realty Co., 134 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1991), aff'd, Civ. No. 3:91-200X, 1991 WL 288833 (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 1991), in which the
court read the statute as not applicable to constructively fraudulent transfers. Id. at
1022. Thus, the court suggested, the statute "excludes the most commonly brought
fraudulent conveyance actions." Id. The bankruptcy court's decision upholding the applicability of the automatic stay to the FDIC's § 1821(d)(17) action against a Chapter 7
debtor was affirmed by the district court on appeal, without reference to the standard
applicable in avoiding transfers under the statute. Colonial Realty, 1991 WL 288833 at
*9.
In FDIC v. Cafritz, 762 F. Supp. 1503 (D.D.C. 1991), the court ruled that the FDIC
had made a sufficient showing to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and the appointment of a trustee pending a determination on the merits. Id. at 1510.
The court found that the FDIC had made a prima facie case of actual fraud under
§ 1821(d)(17) without deciding whether state or federal law applies under the statute
and rejected the defendants' argument that only direct, as distinguished from circumstantial, evidence could be considered by the court in determining whether a fraudulent
conveyance had occurred. Id. at 1506-07.
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cruce, 783 F. Supp. 1309 (D. Kan. 1992), the court
followed Cafritz in sustaining the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1313-14.
Without ruling on whether state law governs the voidability of challenged transfers
under § 1821(d)(17), the court examined the transactions under Kansas law and found
that evidence of three badges of fraud-insolvency of the transferor, lack of consideration "for the most part" for the transfers, and an insider relationship with the transferor-was "enough indices of fraud. . . even under Kansas Law, to present fair grounds
for litigation." Id.
In FDIC v. Owen, Civ. No. 5:91-00389, 1991 WL 173325 (D. Conn. Sept. 3, 1991), the
court sustained the issuance of a preliminary injunction and the seizure of vehicles because the FDIC had shown that while in default on several loans, the debtor conveyed
collateral to his relatives, and his testimony in regard to these transactions lacked credibility. Id. at *14-*19.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1992

61

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 43

Second, the statute does not indicate when an unperfected or undiscovered transfer or obligation is deemed to occur for the purpose of
computing the period of limitations. 23 By explicitly conferring superiority on the rights created by the statute over the rights of a trustee or
any other party under Title 11, however, section 1821(d) appears to
leave the claims of individual creditors under nonbankruptcy law intact. The same is true of the bankruptcy trustee's power under section
544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Such creditors or the trustee thus
would be able to avoid unperfected or undiscovered transfers or obligations under state law or the Bankruptcy Code. The argument in favor
of recognizing the continued validity of individual creditors' rights is
particularly strong in cases concerning transfers and obligations that
are not voidable by the conservator or receiver under section
1841(d)-i.e., cases in which the transfer or obligation is only constructively fraudulent and cases involving transfers or obligations that occurred prior to the commencement of the five year period of limitations prescribed in section 1821(d)(17)(A).
Another problem with section 1841(d) is that it does not specify
how the proceeds of any recovery from a transferee are to be distributed. Thus, employees, suppliers, tort claimants, and other creditors of
the depositary institution, some of whom may have contributed substantially to the value of the property fraudulently transferred, may or
may not be entitled to share in the recovered proceeds, although their
equities may be at least as strong as the beneficiaries of the recovery
based on the statute.
In the recent case of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System of the United States v. MCorp Financial,Inc., 74 the Supreme
Court displayed a troubling insensitivity to the need for a balancing
approach when the policies of the bankruptcy laws and the protection
of creditors' interests conflict with the exigencies of administrative regulation under the banking laws and related statutes. The Court held
that the automatic stay does not preclude the Board of Governors from
continuing ongoing administrative proceedings against a bank holding
company in Chapter 11.111 Nevertheless, the Court was careful to point
out that the administrative proceedings in question had not yet eventuated in any order affecting the bankruptcy court's control of the
debtor's property and that "if and when judicial proceedings are commenced to enforce such an order, then it may well be proper for the
Bankruptcy Court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction under 28

273. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1)(1988) with UNIF.

FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACr

§ 6, 7A U.LA. 658-59 (1985).
274. 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
275. Id. at 463-64.
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U.S.C. § 1334(b)." '2 "

In In re ColonialRealty Co.27 a Connecticut bankruptcy court did
not hesitate to invoke its concurrent jurisdiction over a section
1821(d)(17) fraudulent transfer action brought by the FDIC in the
27 8
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
The FDIC argued that the automatic stay does not apply to proceedings instituted by the FDIC under § 1821(d)(17) and that it should not
be bound by the stay or any ruling of the bankruptcy court based on
the stay.2 7 9 The bankruptcy court disagreed and entered an injunction
against the continuation of the action by the FDIC.2s0 The district
court affirmed 8 ' in the following unequivocal language:
Inasmuch as Congress has not explicitly stated that the FDIC is
exempt from the automatic stay and there is no other authority for
such an exception, I simply cannot accept the position of the FDIC so
that it may, without prior bankruptcy court approval, decide that any
action it wishes to bring to recover fraudulent conveyances complies
with 12 U.S.C. section 1821(d)(17). Were the FDIC allowed to circumvent the automatic stay for such purposes, certainly every bankruptcy
case involving a debtor to an insolvent depositary institution in receivership-a very large number of cases-would degenerate into
chaos, as the FDIC and other creditors compete and race for assets
around the world and as the trustee seeks to intervene, as suggested
by the FDIC, in every action it believes the FDIC should be prevented
from continuing.
We have no evidence that Congress intended any such irrational
and destructive result or that it intended to remove the process of

276. Id. at 464.
277. 134 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991), aff'd, Civ. No. 3:91-200X, 1991 WL
288833 (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 1991).
278. Id. at 1020-21.
279. Id. at 1019-20.
280. Id. at 1025. The bankruptcy court pointed out that although § 1821(d)(17)(D)
grants the FDIC rights superior to those of the bankruptcy trustee, this grant does not
immunize the FDIC from application of the automatic stay. A secured creditor likewise
enjoys superiority to the rights of the trustee but remains subject to the stay. Moreover,
"[t]he automatic stay provisions do not constitute a 'right' of a trustee, but a congressionally-mandated restraint that springs into existence upon the filing of a bankruptcy
case." Id. at 1021. General Counsel for the FDIC and RTC announced that § 1821(d)(17)
"was added to ensure that the special powers given to a conservator/receiver of a failed
financial institution and FDIC/RTC corporate may not be utilized by a bankruptcy trustee under 11 U.S.C. section 544(b), and to provide that the claims of a conservator/receiver and/or FDIC/RTC corporate are superior to the claims of a bankruptcy trustee."
Alfred J.T. Byrne, Basic Issues Affecting the FDIC and the RTC in Bankruptcy Cases,
65th Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges 7-39, 7-42
(1992).
281. In re Colonial Realty Co., Civ. No. 3:91-200X, 1991 WL 288833 (D. Conn. Dec.
30, 1991).
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recovering
assets from the administrative oversight of the bankruptcy
2
28

courts.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The UFCA, UFTA, and the Bankruptcy Code have all assimilated
the treatment of fraudulent obligations to the treatment of fraudulent
transfers. When property that has been fraudulently transferred is no
longer recoverable, the transferee has been subjected to an obligation
to pay for its value, typically measured as of the time of the transfer. If
the transfer is avoided and the property is recovered, the Bankruptcy
Code contains implications that the transferee has a claim for the
value of the property disgorged. The courts generally have declined to
allow a claim on behalf of a transferee who isfound guilty of intentional fraud, but there is authority to the contrary. Good faith transferees or obligees are accorded a lien against the fraudulently transferred property to the extent they gave value for the property.
Equitably subordinating the claim of a fraudulent transferee pursuant
to section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code has been recognized as appropriate in a number of recent cases. Although equitable subordination may be useful in fashioning relief in particular circumstances, it
probably has limited utility as a remedy against fraudulent transferees
and obligees.
It is sometimes difficult to determine who is a transferee in a
fraudulent transaction when the defendant argues that it was merely a
conduit. In Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. European American
Bank2 13 Judge Easterbrook required that a defendant have "dominion
over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one's own
purposes," in order to be a transferee. 284 The Kaiser Steel cases, however, complicated the definition of transferee. The bankruptcy court
held that stockbrokers who had received funds from the debtor in redemption of customer stock are liable as transferees because they act
as agents for undisclosed principals. 285 The district court reversed,
however, holding that agency principles do not apply. 286 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed on the basis that section 546(e) of the Code precludes

282. Id. at *6-*7.
283. 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
284. Id. at 893.
285. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 105 B.R. 639, 649-50
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1989), rev'd sub non.Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 B.R. 514 (D. Colo.), aff'd sub nom. Kaiser1, 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir.
1990).
286. Kaiser Steel Resources, 110 B.R. at 522-23.
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any recovery from stockbrokers.2 81 7 The Tenth Circuit did not reach the
correctness of the district court's ruling in favor of the stockbrokers
grounded on a lack of contractual relationship between the stockbrokers and the corporate debtor.
The law of fraudulent transfers allows recovery from transferees of
property or its value when the property has been transferred to defeat
creditors' rights. Professor Glenn's treatise, Fraudulent Conveyances
and Preferences, has been influential in deterring the recognition of
28
any liability in tort for aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer.
Nonetheless, a judicial willingness to impose liability on those who aid
and abet fraudulent transfers is emerging. Such liability has not been
predicated on the law of fraudulent conveyances but on implications
derived from the law governing fiduciary relationships and from recently enacted statutes, including the Bankruptcy Code and the RICO
Act. Courts have no difficulty finding that the bankruptcy trustee has
standing to assert RICO claims if the debtor is an entity. However,
individual debtors are another matter because they are in pari delicto.
Barnett v. Stern28 9 recognized that the trustee in bankruptcy has
standing to represent all creditors in proceedings under the Act against
persons involved in prepetition fraudulent transfers. In distinguishing
Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 290 the court relied on cases
that allowed the trustee to pursue alter-ego causes of action.2 9' However, RICO's effectiveness has been limited by several cases which have
indicated that RICO claims brought by creditors are too speculative or
are not ripe until the fraudulent transfer claims of the trustee are
22
resolved.
Section 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires trustees to bring
actions to avoid fraudulent transfers within two years of their appointment or before the closing or dismissal of the case. The debtor in possession appears not to be subject to a time limitation as long as the
case is pending. With the exception of Bankruptcy Judge Lifland's
2 93
opinion in Korvettes, Inc. v. Sanyo Electric (In re Korvettes, Inc.),
the courts applied the statute as it was written until 1990, when four
courts, including the Tenth Circuit in Zilkha Energy Co. v. Leigh-

287. Kaiser 11, 952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992);
Kaiser I, 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990).
288. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
289. 93 B.R. 962 (N.D. I1. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 909 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.
1990).
290. 406 U.S. 416 (1972).
291. Barnett, 93 B.R. at 967-72.
292. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
293. 42 B.R. 217 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 67 B.R. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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ton,29' rewrote the statute and subjected debtors in possession to the
two-year statute of limitations. Under pre-Code law a liquidating trustee was given two years within which to bring avoidance actions, but
the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of a reorganization case. The tolling provisions of the Bankruptcy Act applicable in
reorganization cases were not incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code,
but there is no evidence that Congress intended to deny the benefit of
tolling to debtors in possession. In view of the duties and incentives
operating when a debtor is retained in possession, the Zilkha interpretation of section 546(a) is seriously objectionable on policy grounds.
It was held in the Gleneagles case29 5 that state statutes of limitations on fraudulent transfer actions are not operative against the federal government.19 According to the prevailing view, if the applicable
state period of limitations has not expired when a debtor files bankruptcy, section 546(a) extends the limitations period. A potential conflict between sections 108(a) and 546(a) of the Code has been resolved
by recognizing that when the latter section applies, a federal rather
than a state cause of action is being asserted. Moreover, section 108(a)
applies only to causes of action that belong to the debtor; it does not
apply to causes of action the trustee asserts by way of subrogation
2 97
under section 544(b).
The UFTA, UFCA, and section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code have
generally been held applicable to fraudulent transfer claims that arise
from leveraged buyouts, but the Tenth Circuit in the two Kaiser Steel
cases has held that section 546(e) bars the trustee from recovering
against stockholders who are either stockbrokers or who are represented by stockbrokers-at least when the distributions to the stockbrokers could be considered settlement payments. 29 8 Kaiser's argument
that section 546(e) was not intended to immunize extraordinary securities transactions like leveraged buyouts was rejected on the basis of a
literal reading of the statute. 29 " Although shareholders who sold their
shares prior to an LBO and those who sold them afterward may be in
quite different positions vis-a-vis creditors of the corporate debtor, the
court took comfort in treating them the same way under its reading of

294. 920 F.2d 1520 (10th Cir. 1990).
295. United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983), afl'd
sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).

296. Id. at 583.
297. See Lynn v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank (In re Corland Corp.), Adv. No. 388-3529
(Bankr, N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 1989).

298. See supra notes 206-61 and accompanying text.
299. Kaiser11, 952 F.2d 1230, 1238-41 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015
(1992).
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section 546(e). It is unfortunate that the court refused to consider the
legislative history of the statute in construing the undefined term "settlement payment."
Congress added section 1821(d)(17) to Title 12 as a special fraudulent transfer law for the FDIC and other conservators of insured depository institutions who pursue property and its proceeds fraudulently disposed of by those responsible for the "dramatic decline of the
savings and loan industry."30 0 The statute grants superiority for the
rights it creates over the trustee's rights under the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 1821(d)(17) is not well drafted, however, and appears not to
reach constructively fraudulent transfers. It has a five-year statute of
limitations but has been construed to have a retroactive application.
The District Court of Connecticut in In re Colonial Realty Co." 1 held
that the statute does not preclude applicability of the automatic stay
and upheld an injunction issued by the bankruptcy court against the
FDIC's pursuit of its new remedy, notwithstanding its statutory
02
3

superiority.

300. 136 CONG. REC. E 3684 (1990) (statement of Rep. Schuler); see supra notes 26282 and accompanying text.
301. Civ. No. 3:91-200X, 1991 WL 288833 (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 1991).
302. Id. at *6-*7.
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